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### Contention 1: China

#### Shut down nearly decimated investor confidence in Mexican export industry—

Paterson 10-11-13 Kent Paterson, Frontera NorteSur // October 11, 2013 // Business & Technology “U.S. crisis unsettles Mexico” [http://newspapertree.com/articles/2013/10/11/us-crisis-unsettles-mexico] [MG]

The partial shutdown of the U.S. government is unsettling the Mexican economy. As the crisis took shape last week, the Mexican peso dipped to 13.34 units per dollar, an amount which represented the second largest depreciation in 2013. The pending October 17 showdown over the U.S. debt limit is likewise contributing to the jitters, said Gabriela Siller, an analyst for Mexico-based Banco Base. In the Mexico-U.S. border region, Mexican business leaders expressed worry that the political gridlock on the Potomac could deepen and trigger devastating consequences on the assembly-for-export, or maquiladora, industry. In Ciudad Juarez and other border cities, the foreign-owned maquiladora sector constitutes a dominant or major part of the economy. Longer export times, reduced market demand and idled assembly lines are among the concerns voiced by Ciudad Juarez business representatives. “The economy is flowing at the moment, but we don’t know how it is going to behave at the end of the year,” said Rodolfo Martinez Garza, president of the Association of Customs Agents in Ciudad Juarez. Martinez added that the last quarter of the year is the biggest season of import-export activity, and that unstable economic circumstances could result in stagnation. “There is a lot of uncertainty for investment and this is very negative for Ciudad Juarez,” Martinez said. According to Mexico’s National Council of the Maquiladora Industry and Export Manufacturing, any effects of the U.S. shutdown should be measurable in industrial production after October 20. Thomas Fullerton, economist for the University of Texas at El Paso, said the impacts of the U.S. government shutdown on the maquildora industry – which also supports thousands of jobs in his city – could be worse than the previous one in 1995-96 because of the still-incomplete recovery from the 2008 economic crash. The U.S. crisis comes at a time when worries already exist over the state of the Mexican economy and the tax reform looming in the Mexican Congress, including a possible hike in the border region sales tax from its current 11 percent to 16 percent. In Ciudad Juarez, many business, community and political leaders oppose the sales tax hike and warn of an outflow of pesos to neighboring Texas and New Mexico, where sales taxes are much lower, if the Mexican Congress increases the tax this fall under the proposal advanced by the Pena Nieto administration. This week, a coalition of popular organizations, tire and used car industry groups delivered at petition with 12,733 signatures against the sales tax hike to Congresswoman Martha Beatriz Cordoba. A member of the Citizen Movement party, Corboba has emerged as a leader against a higher tax. The political turmoil and debates in both Washington and Mexico City occur at a moment when indicators reveal some adverse trends in the Mexican economy. On October 8, the International Monetary Fund projected that Mexico’s 2013 growth rate would be a mere 1.2 percent – far less than the growth in the 3 percent range widely predicted earlier in the year. In the Latin American and Caribbean group of nations, Mexico’s growth performance puts it in the same general camp this year as Brazil, Venezuela and Jamaica. Agustin de la Torre, chief economist for the World Bank, was surprised by the weak Mexican growth report. “We do not have an easy explanation on why Mexico did not recuperate,” de la Torre said. “Without a doubt, there is an enormous contrast between the perception that investors have of Mexico in light of structural reforms on the one hand and the low growth this year on the other.”

#### Neito tax reform uniquely places sustainability at risk—

Replogle 9-20-13 Jill Replogle, Fronteras Reporter, KPBS “Mexico Fiscal Reform Could Be Bad For Maquiladoras” [<http://www.kpbs.org/news/2013/sep/20/mexico-fiscal-reform-could-be-bad-maquiladoras/>] [MG]

The maquiladora export industry that’s a key component of the U.S.-Mexico border economy could face major changes under proposed reforms to Mexico’s tax system. Mexico currently collects fewer taxes from its citizens and companies than almost any other developed country. Mexico relies heavily on revenues from its state-run oil industry, which is in decline. Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto wants to change this. One way he wants to do it is by tightening control over the country’s vast maquiladora export industry. Factories that make and export goods to the U.S. and other foreign markets currently don’t pay taxes on their raw materials and machinery. But that would change under the proposed reform. Maquiladoras would have to pay the normal 16 percent sales tax on their raw materials and then request a refund of that money when they export the final product. That would require exporters to invest a lot more cash up front, said Héctor Vega, a tax partner with Deloitte Mexico. It could erase some of the advantage Mexico has over its manufacturing competitors, Vega said. “Because we are very close to the U.S., it’s very natural doing business,” he said. “However, this 16 percent will impact a lot and maybe determinate where you put your investment, either in China, either in Vietnam, either in Malaysia or keep it in Mexico.” Still, Vega is hopeful that the tax change affecting maquiladoras will ultimately be stripped from the final fiscal reform bill.

#### Collapse threatens national security—altering engagement policy is critical to sustain it

Rapiey ‘11 Stanley Joseph Rapiey, Department of Defense Civilian “Maquiladoras and National Security: Design Theory as a Guide.” 25, October, 2011 [MG]

The Mexican maquiladora industry is rapidly losing market share to Asian competitors that dramatically undercut them in terms of labor cost. The decline of these assembly-for-export factories will result in instability along the U.S.-Mexico border and will prove to be a serious national security issue for the United States. This paper leverages Design theory to frame the problems surrounding Mexico’s maquiladora industry in order to develop an understanding of this complex adaptive system. It examines the wide range of actors involved in the system, focusing on their goals, motivations and conflicting tendencies. Finally, the paper recommends courses of action for U.S. and Mexican leaders that will mitigate the resulting instability in the Mexican northern border states. The economic stability of Mexico will always be a national security priority for the United States. The two nations share a border of nearly 2,000 miles, and trade between them is worth billions of dollars. To take advantage of this relationship, the Mexican government created a series of customs and trade policies specifically designed to enhance its economic ties to the U.S. For decades, such policies greatly benefited Mexico’s maquiladoras, factories that import raw materials, rapidly combine them into finished products, and export them to the American market. Unfortunately for Mexico, the strong advantages in low-cost labor and speedy delivery are gradually being eroded by similar programs in China and Southeast Asia. As U.S. companies look to Asia for more profitable business relationships, the Mexican government has done little to alter its customs and trade policies in response. A severe economic blow to the maquiladoras along the U.S. border would have dramatic effects on the stability of the area, affecting both Mexican and American national security interests. The governments of Mexico and the United States should therefore take preemptive measures to mitigate the instability that is arising as the maquiladoras lose their viability under new global economic pressures. These measures include altering customs and trade policies, providing economic incentives in order to transform the Mexican export industry, and creating labor opportunities for Mexicans within the United States. In order to support this thesis, the following paper will leverage Design Theory to examine the current situation in the Mexican maquiladora industry, identify problems in terms of potential impacts to U.S. national security, and propose possible courses of action for both American and Mexican decision-makers.

#### This threatens the entire relationship and causes industries to shift toward China—

Rapiey ‘11 Stanley Joseph Rapiey, Department of Defense Civilian “Maquiladoras and National Security: Design Theory as a Guide.” 25, October, 2011

The Problem Frame highlights the issues that must be addressed in order to transform current conditions into the desired end state.25 In this case, the desired end state is a more stable economy in the northern Mexican states, free from the current stress brought about by the decline in the maquiladora industry. Since 60% of Mexican maquiladoras operate in the border states, this end state is a key factor in the stability of the border area for both the United States and Mexico.26 Additionally, 80% of all Mexican exports are to the United States, making this relationship extremely important.27 It is in the best interest of these nations to take action to reach this end state. In order to develop future courses of action that create conditions conducive for the desired end state, the current challenges that currently exist in this system must be examined. The three major challenges to reaching the desired end state are connected to flaws in the Mexican export industry, specifically its inability to respond to global competition, its overreliance on the American market, and its lack of complexity. A fourth challenge is connected to the free flow of labor in this region. These challenges are obstacles in the path to a stable and secure northern Mexico. First of all, Mexico’s response to increased competition for its maquiladoras has been completely inadequate. Over the past decade, China has presented an attractive alternative to Mexican maquiladoras in terms of labor costs. In 2008, Chinese hourly manufacturing wages were estimated nearly 75% cheaper than those in Mexico.28 For over a decade, Chinese factories have been able to assemble goods of equal quality as the maquiladoras, but now they can provide greater quality control and better physical infrastructure.29 As drug violence continues in Mexico, security has become a greater decision point for businesses as well, and many are concerned that investing in Mexico is a risk.30 Mexico’s two main responses to this situation have been extremely inadequate and have not improved the overall situation. The Mexican government’s first response was to escalate anti-Chinese rhetoric, even working to delay China’s entry into the World Trade Organization.31 This merely delayed the inevitable and resolved nothing. Later, driven by the need to compete with China, Mexican factories laid off personnel and cut worker salaries in order to reduce labor costs.32 Considering the weak global economy, this unfortunate move added pressure to an already-stressed workforce. The resultant increases in unemployment and underemployment, combined with reduced salaries, will increase instability in the region as people are driven to crime, either as victims or participants.33

#### US reliance on Chinese technology for military purposes undermines its capability and allows for Chinese espionage

Snyder 5/29/13 – (Michael, “Why The Next War With China Could Go Very Badly For The United States”, http://www.infowars.com/why-the-next-war-with-china-could-go-very-badly-for-the-united-states/)//javi

Another way that China is gaining a strategic advantage over the U.S. is by getting the U.S. military to become increasingly dependent upon them. According to Forbes, now the U.S. military is even leasing a Chinese satellite for communications purposes… American dependence on China grows by the day. The latestnews is that the United States has been reduced to leasing a Chinese satellite to handle communications with U.S. military bases in Africa. Surprising, isn’t it? The nation that launched the world’s first communications satellite (I remember it well – it was called Telstar) has so lost its manufacturing mojo that it has to rely on its most formidable military adversary to provide the hardware for some of its most sensitive communications. This at a time when underlying unemployment rates among U.S. manufacturing workers remain at near-depression levels. Isn’t that crazy? And a recent Senate report discovered that many of our most advanced weapons systems are absolutely riddled with counterfeit Chinese parts… A recent Senate report, titled Inquiry Into Counterfeit Electronic Parts In The Department Of Defense Supply Chain, “uncovered overwhelming evidence of large numbers of counterfeit parts making their way into critical defense systems.” The investigation found 1,800 cases of counterfeit electronic parts involving over one million suspect parts in 2009-10 alone, thereby exposing “a defense supply chain that relies on hundreds of unveiled independent distributors to supply electronic parts for some of our most sensitive systems.” The report concluded, among other things, that China is the “dominant source” of counterfeit products that enter the DoD supply chain, that the Chinese government does little to stop it and that the DoD doesn’t know the “scope and impact” of these parts on critical defense systems. Who in the world would be stupid enough to allow one of their greatest strategic enemies to supply large numbers of parts for key weapons systems? Apparently we are that stupid. Things are particularly bad when it comes to semiconductors… Senator John McCain commented: “We can’t tolerate the risk of a ballistic missile interceptor failing to hit its target, a helicopter pilot unable to fire his missiles, or any other mission failure because of a counterfeit part.” Calling the issue “a ticking time bomb,” Brian Toohey, president of the Semiconductor Industry Association, commented: “The catastrophic failure risk inherently found in counterfeit semiconductors places our citizens and military personnel in unreasonable peril.” It would be bad enough if we just had to worry about counterfeit parts failing. But what if China has a way to shut some of those parts down in the event of a conflict? What if some of those parts contain “Trojan Horse” computer chips or malware? That may sound crazy, but unfortunately Trojan Horse chips can be extremely difficult to detect. The following is from a recent Forbes article… As the Defense Science Board pointed out, Trojan Horse circuitry is almost impossible to detect even with the most rigorous analysis. This is particularly so if a saboteur can accomplish matching subversions in both software and relevant hardware.

#### Chinese espionage is the biggest internal link to Chinese military modernization

U.S.-China ESRC 7 – U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission[Report to Congress-The Commission was made up of members of the 110th Congress, 1st Session, November, <http://www.uscc.gov/annual_report/2007/report_to_congress.pdf>The pace and success of China’s military modernization continue to exceed U.S. government estimates**.** Indeed, on occasion the U.S. defense and intelligence communities have been taken by surprise, 7 as in the case of the launching of the Jin class submarine by the navy of the People’s Liberation Army. China’s defense industry is producing new generations of weapon platforms with impressive speed and quality, and these advancements are duein partto the highly effective manner in which Chinese defense companies are integrating commercial technologies into military systems. Additionally, industrial espionage provides Chinese companies an added source of new technology without the necessity of investing time or money to perform research. Chinese espionage in the United States, which now comprises the single greatest threat to U.S. technology, is straining the U.S. counterintelligence establishment. This illicit activity significantly contributes to China’s military modernization and acquisition of new capabilities.

#### US can no longer win the war due to Chinese tech advancement through espionage

Snyder 5/29/13 – (Michael, “Why The Next War With China Could Go Very Badly For The United States”, http://www.infowars.com/why-the-next-war-with-china-could-go-very-badly-for-the-united-states/)//javi

Most Americans assume that the U.S. military is so vastly superior to everyone else that no other nation would ever dream of fighting a full-scale war against us. Unfortunately, that assumption is dead wrong. In recent years, the once mammoth technological gap between the U.S. military and the Chinese military has been closing at a frightening pace. China has been accomplishing this by brazenly stealing our technology and hacking into our computer systems. The Pentagon and the Obama administration know all about this, but they don’t do anything about it. Perhaps the fact that China owns about a trillion dollars of our national debt has something to do with that. In any event, today China has the largest military in the world and the second largest military budget in the world. They have stolen plans for our most advanced jets, helicopters, ships and missile systems. It is estimated that stealing our technology has saved China about 25 years of research and development. In addition, China is rapidly developing a new generation of strategic weapons that could potentially enable it to actually win a future war against the United States. At one time such a notion would have been unthinkable, but as you will see below, the next war with China could go very badly for the United States.

#### Chinese military modernization causes nuclear war

Twomey 9, co-directs the Center for Contemporary Conflict and is an assistant professor in the Department of National Security Affairs, both @ the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA, 9 [Christopher, Arms Control Association, “Chinese-U.S. Strategic Affairs: Dangerous Dynamism, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2009\_01-02/china\_us\_dangerous\_dynamism#Twomey]

China and the United States are not in a strategic weapons arms race. Nonetheless, their modernization and sizing decisions increasingly are framed with the other in mind. Nuclear weapons are at the core of this interlocking pattern of development. In particular, China is the only permanent member of the UN Security Council expanding its arsenal; it is also enhancing its arsenal. The basic facts of Chinese strategic modernization are well known, if the details remain frustratingly opaque. China is deploying road-mobile, solid-fueled missiles, giving it a heighted degree of security in its second-strike capability. It is beginning to deploy ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). It is researching a wide range of warhead and delivery systems technologies that will lead to increased accuracy and, more pointedly, increased penetration against ballistic missile defenses. The size of China's deliverable arsenal against the United States will undoubtedly increase beyond the few dozen that it possessed recently.[1] The pace of growth thus far has been moderate, although China has only recently developed reliable, survivable delivery systems. The final endpoint remains mired in opacity and uncertainty, although several score of deliverable warheads seems likely for the near term. These developments on the strategic side are coupled with elements of conventional modernization that impinge on the strategic balance.[2] The relevant issue, however, is not simply an evaluation of the Chinese modernization program, but rather an evaluation of the interaction of that modernization with U.S. capabilities and interests. U.S. capabilities are also changing. Under the provisions of START and SORT, the United States has continued to engage in quantitative reductions of its operational nuclear arsenal. At the same, there is ongoing updating of warhead guidance and fusing systems. Ballistic missile defense systems of a variety of footprints are being deployed. The U.S. SSBN force now leans more toward the Pacific than the Atlantic, reversing the Cold War deployment. Guam's capacity to support heavy bombers and attack submarines has been enhanced. Furthermore, advances in U.S. conventional weaponry have been so substantial that they too promise strategic effects: prompt global strike holds out the promise of a U.S. weapon on target anywhere in the world in less than an hour and B-2s with highly accurate weapons can sustain strategic effects over a campaign. What are the concerns posed by these two programs of dynamic strategic arsenals? Most centrally, the development of the strategic forces detailed above has increasingly assumed an interlocked form. The U.S. revolution in precision guided munitions was followed by an emphasis on mobility in the Chinese missile force. U.S. missile defense systems have clearly spurred an emphasis on countermeasures in China's ICBM force and quantitative buildups in its regional missile arsenals.[3] Beijing's new submarine-based forces further enhance the security of China's second-strike capability in the face of a potential U.S. strike but are likely to lead to increased attention to anti-submarine warfare in the United States. China's recent anti-satellite test provoked a U.S. demonstration of similar capabilities. Such reciprocal responses have the potential to move toward a tightly coupled arms race and certainly have already worsened threat perceptions on each side. The potential for conflict is not simply that of inadvertent escalation; there are conflicts of interests between the two. Heightening threat perceptions in that context greatly complicates diplomacy. Further, the dangers of inadvertent escalation have been exacerbated by some of these moves. Chinese SSBN deployment will stress an untested command-and-control system. Similar dangers in the Cold War were mitigated, although not entirely overcome, over a period of decades of development of personnel and technical solutions. China appears to have few such controls in place today. U.S. deployment of highly accurate nuclear warheads is consistent with a first-strike doctrine and seems sized for threats larger than "rogue" nations. These too would undermine stability in an intense crisis.

### Plan

#### The United States federal government ought to offer financial assistance toward the assembly-for-export industry in Mexico.

### Contention 2: Manufacturing

#### Foreign investment is key to evolve factories technologically—

Rapiey ‘11 Stanley Joseph Rapiey, Department of Defense Civilian “Maquiladoras and National Security: Design Theory as a Guide.” 25, October, 2011

A third challenge associated with this system concerns the lack of complexity of the production performed by the maquiladoras. The vast majority of maquiladoras conduct simple assembly, so the factories involved are tooled for basic production, and the employees only have basic skills. This drastically limits the ability of both the factories and their employees to adjust to new forms of production as the maquiladoras fall to foreign competitors. This industry is so tightly tied to specific customers in the U.S. that a transition to some other form of production would require massive changes in structure and labor. The Mexican government understands this as a problem and seeks to drive the evolution of so-called “first generation” maquiladoras to second and third generation models. The first generation maquiladoras are the least complex and simply assemble raw materials. Foreign investment brings with it technology, and, with this technology, the maquiladoras evolve into more complex factories that eventually focus less on labor intensity and more on more sophisticated products, R&D and even product design.39 Unfortunately, there are few examples of this trend, and many critics complain that the entire concept of the maquiladora “traps developing countries into the deadend role of providing cheap labor for low value-added assembly operations.”40

#### US financial assistance is key for manufacturing

Villarreal 8/9/12 – (M. Angeles, “U.S.-Mexico Economic Relations: Trends, Issues, and Implications”, Congressional Research Service, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32934.pdf)//javi

Foreign direct investment (FDI) has been an integral part of the economic relationship between the United States and Mexico since NAFTA implementation. FDI consists of investments in real estate, manufacturing plants, and retail facilities, in which the foreign investor owns 10% or more of the entity. The United States is the largest source of FDI in Mexico. The stock of U.S. FDI increased from $17.0 billion in 1994 to $91.4 billion in 2011, a 440% increase (see Table 4). Mexican FDI in the United States is much lower than U.S. investment in Mexico, with levels of Mexican FDI fluctuating over the last 10 years. In 2010, Mexican FDI in the United States totaled $12.6 billion (see Table 4). The sharp rise in U.S. investment in Mexico since NAFTA is also a result of the liberalization of Mexico’s restrictions on foreign investment in the late 1980s and the early 1990s. Prior to the mid-1980s, Mexico had a very protective policy that restricted foreign investment and controlled the exchange rate to encourage domestic growth, affecting the entire industrial sector. Mexico’s trade liberalization measures and economic reform in the late 1980s represented a sharp shift in policy and helped bring in a steady increase of FDI flows into Mexico. NAFTA provisions on foreign investment helped to lock in the reforms and increase investor confidence. Under NAFTA, Mexico gave U.S. and Canadian investors nondiscriminatory treatment of their investments as well as investor protection. NAFTA may have encouraged U.S. FDI in Mexico by increasing investor confidence, but much of the growth may have occurred anyway because Mexico likely would have continued to liberalize its foreign investment laws with or without the agreement. Nearly half of total FDI investment in Mexico is in the manufacturing industry, of which the maquiladora industry forms a major part. (See “Mexico’s Export-Oriented Assembly Plants” below.) In Mexico, the industry has helped attract investment from countries such as the United States that have a relatively large amount of capital. For the United States, the industry is important because U.S. companies are able to locate their labor-intensive operations in Mexico and lower their labor costs in the overall production process.

#### Investment is critical for relations —Key to solve border security, trafficking, and the economy

Rapiey ‘11 Stanley Joseph Rapiey, Department of Defense Civilian “Maquiladoras and National Security: Design Theory as a Guide.” 25, October, 2011 [MG]

The relevant policy drivers for the United States government are preserving stability along its border, curbing illegal immigration, maintaining a strong domestic economy, and building productive relationships with Mexico.20 It should be immediately noted that these goals can come into conflict with one another. For example, although maintaining a thriving economy entails ensuring that U.S. businesses have the opportunity to engage in deals that are the most lucrative, abandoning current relationships with Mexican factories could negatively affect relations between the two countries. Current initiatives to secure the Southern border and curb illegal immigration might also affect how the U.S. interacts with Mexico in the economic or anti-drug arenas. Mexico’s goals are extremely similar to those of the United States. Security and stability along its border, a strong domestic economy, and building strong relations with the U.S. are all high priorities for the Mexican government. Illegal immigration, although a contentious issue for the United States, is not bothersome for Mexico.21 Although nearly identical on the surface, the Mexican goals involve different priorities than those of the U.S. For example, a strong domestic economy for Mexico means a continuance of the large amount of remittances from Mexicans in the United States.22 It also concerns focusing its industry on the production of goods for domestic consumption and focusing on high-tech indigenous models.23 For Mexico, “building strong relations” with the United States involves the receipt of assistance, whereas for the U.S., such relations mean increased cooperation on terrorism and illegal immigration.24 The differences in tendencies and goals for the actors in this system will become the center of analysis during the Problem Frame.

#### Mexican manufacturing is critical to address challenges facing the U.S. – picks up the slack for U.S. manufacturing

Bañuelos et al 12 (Carlos Guzmán Bofill, Ana María Rivas Llamas, Carlos Casas Guerrero, Juan Ángel Vargas Plata, Juan Carlos Téllez Girón Barrón, Luis Anthony Olivé Hawley, Sebastián Escalante Bañuelos, Natalia Herrero Martínez, Izael Mijangos González, June, http://www.promexico.gob.mx/work/models/promexico/Resource/1985/1/images/Aerospace\_CHIHUAHUA\_ENG.pdf)

In the last decade, Mexico has proven that it has the capabilities and talent in advanced manufacturing to supply the international market of the aerospace industry. The integration of design and advanced manufacturing capabilities on a national level prove that the Mexican industry has included high technology and engineering in its processes. Through the projects identified in this Road Map, which involves the efforts of academia, industry and government, Chihuahua will become the leading A+D cluster in Latin America in precision manufacturing for the high-tech industry and dual-use goods. This exercise identified projects and factors that will promote Chihuahua’s ability to attract future high technology investments for the aerospace and defense sector by as well as creating the capabilities to optimize the sector’s industrial competitiveness in the region, such as: the creation of a talent management platform; reducing dependency on the importation of molds, dyes and tooling in the sector; and making better use of future investments that have been encouraged by Mexico’s acceptance in the WA. Chihuahua has been able to determine the right path to reach its maximum potential and become one of Mexico´s most competitive regions in the aerospace sector with a medium- and long-term vision. The road to success has been forged, and the coming years will be bursting with opportunities and new challenges for Chihuahua.

#### Mexico is key – the US can’t solve

Bañuelos et al 12 (Carlos Guzmán Bofill, Ana María Rivas Llamas, Carlos Casas Guerrero, Juan Ángel Vargas Plata, Juan Carlos Téllez Girón Barrón, Luis Anthony Olivé Hawley, Sebastián Escalante Bañuelos, Natalia Herrero Martínez, Izael Mijangos González, June, http://www.promexico.gob.mx/work/models/promexico/Resource/1985/1/images/Aerospace\_CHIHUAHUA\_ENG.pdf)

The United States our major commercial partner is going through a talent crisis due to a lack of engineering graduates, added to constant cuts in defense spending, which complicates the upkeep of its current abilities to research, develop and produce defense and high-tech dual-use items. Mexico has more engineering graduates per capita than the United States and skilled and engineering labor costs are more competitive in Mexico; the technological sophistication of its manufactured goods is above that of BRIC countries such as India and Brazil. These three factors make Mexico the best answer to the issues that affect the United States. The creation of the SCE and Mexico’s acceptance into the WA have laid the foundation to guarantee national surveillance during the export of restricted and dual-use technologies and goods. According to conservative estimates, the WA will enable the national industry to access a potential high-technology export market of close to an additional 11.3 billion dollars per year, added to the potential creation of between 30 and 40 thousand highly paid jobs in the next five years.7 Chihuahua’s advanced manufacturing vocation (landing gears, fuselages, engines, harnesses and precision machining) make it the ideal destination for projects in the A+D cluster. Furthermore, the Federal Government is in negotiations with the US Department of Defense to develop a regional aerospace and defense manufacturing block focused on Buy NAFTA. This could be completed with the signing of a MoU between the US Department of State and the Ministry of National Defense (SEDENA)

#### Manufacturing drives innovation and pharmaceuticals

Swezey 11 (Devon Swezey, Project Director for Breakthrough Institute where he works as an energy and climate policy analyst and Ryan McConaghy, pg online @ <http://thebreakthrough.org/blog/BTI_Third_Way_Idea_Brief_-_Manufacturing_Growth_.pdf>)

New manufacturing thrives on and drives innovation. Manufacturing is a core component of the nation’s innovation ecosystem. Firms engaged in manufacturing re-invest a significant portion of revenues in research and development (R&D). Overall, the manufacturing sector comprises two-thirds 9 of industry investment in R&D and employs nearly 64% of the country’s scientists and engineers. 10 Manufacturers also have unique opportunities to apply new technologies for specialized functions and achieve economies of scale at the plant or firm, 11 making the return on manufacturing R&D significant. The transition to advanced manufacturing will enhance the sector’s role in fostering innovation and developing and commercializing new technologies. Advanced manufacturing industries, including semiconductors, computers, pharmaceuticals, clean energy technologies, and nanotechnology, play an outsized role in generating the new technologies, products, and processes that drive economic growth. Advanced manufacturing is also characterized by the rapid transfer of science and technology into manufacturing processes and products, which in and of itself drives innovation. The research-to-manufacturing process is cyclical, with multiple feedbacks between basic R&D, pre-competitive research, prototyping, product development, and manufacturing. This opens new possibilities for product development and manufacturing. 12

#### Tech innovation solves extinction

Zhong 07, CEO at Jade Bird Dashing, 7-31-7 (Roger, “The Effects and Influences of Technology on Society and Humyn Kind,” http://scienceray.com/technology/applied-science/the-effects-and-influences-of-technology-on-society-and-humyn-kind/”)

The question that persists however, is, “Is technology in fact harming our society as a whole?” Albeit the fact that this is a remarkably intricate question of sorts, it can be answered with a simple answer. The actuality of this situation remains that technology is by no means detrimental to our society here in the United States, civilization throughout the world, or to the greater humynity of the humyn race; instead, it is vital to its survival. Nuclear Technology To illustrate this point, let us first examine an exceedingly significant technological advance of our time, nuclear technology. Nuclear technology is research that involves the reactions of atomic nuclei. It has many vital applications in modern society, the most prominent of which are nuclear weapons, nuclear medicine, and nuclear power. The most controversial of these is, without a doubt, nuclear weapons. First created by the United States in 1945 during World War II, they were developed out of the fear that Nazi Germany would first develop them. A weapon of incredible power, a single nuclear weapon has to potential to decimate, level, and destroy an entire city. The first and only times a nuclear weapon has been used are in World War II, when the United States bombed the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki with the “Little Boy” and “Fat Myn” bombs, respectively. The usage of these bombs allowed for the near instantaneous end to the destructive World War II. Although two cities were leveled and many lives were lost, the situation involving the usage of these nuclear weapons is not nearly as negative as one may perceive. Had the bombs not been dropped, Japan would not have surrendered, and it would have without a doubt prolonged the war for months or even years. This would have forced an Allied Forces ground invasion of Japan in an effort to end the war, which would have resulted in the loss of many more people than caused by the deployment of the two nuclear weapons. When you look at the usage of nuclear technology, you must look at the situation from the viewpoint of humyn society as a whole, and not from a standpoint of an individual. While the nuclear bombs destroyed two cities and killed many, they ended a horrific World War II and prevented the loss of many other lives. Today, in more modern terms, nuclear weapons play a huge role in our lives. As citizens of the United States, it is common knowledge that we are guaranteed many degrees of freedoms and rights, but have you ever considered who enforces our right to these freedoms in the world? The military might of the United States is the key to us retaining our democratic freedoms. Being in possession of nuclear weapons is not only a positive thing, it allows for us to be free. By holding an arsenal of nuclear weapons, we have a nuclear deterrent. In this sense, we prevent wars and conflicts from escalating into another World War by instituting world order. By having nuclear technology, we are ensuring the well-being, longevity, and freedoms of the humyn race. Internet Technology Another prominent technological innovation that well represents our society today is the Internet. The Internet is the worldwide, publicly accessible network of interconnected computer networks that transmit data between themselves. It is an extremely large network that consists of countless smaller networks. The World Wide Web is accessible only through this Internet infrastructure which allows us our access to websites, email, file sharing, downloads, and media. As well as being an important provider for us common citizens who wish to access the World Wide Web, the internet serves a much greater purpose. It allows for the sharing of information almost instantaneously between scholars, researchers, and others. It allows for information to be shared from the United States to China in less than a second. Before the times of the internet, the other alternatives to transmit information were not nearly as efficient or effective. The Internet allows for us to, in some ways make the world smaller. In the days of today’s stock markets, financial infrastructure, global news organizations, powerful militarizes, strong governments and big corporations, instantaneous communication is an asset we can not afford to lose. The Internet allows for our society in modern day times to interconnect and promote globalization and information sharing. Medical Technology Perhaps one of the most vital technological advances in our society today is in the field of humyn medicine and health sciences. This field deals with the maintenance, prolongment, and restoration of humyn health through the study, diagnosis, treatment, and prevention of disease and injury. Medicine is an area where knowledge is obtained, then applied to treatment. It has been around at least as far as the beginning of recorded history, perhaps even farther. Today, modern medicine is practiced within a well-developed framework of health-care infrastructure. Research in the field of medicine has allowed for the development of many new treatments, drugs, medicines, and solutions that have allowed for the dramatic prolongment of the humyn lifespan. Today, with the influence of medicine, the lifespan of the average humyn is only increasing. Medicine in today’s world provides the most vital of all services; it ensures the survival of the humyn race as a whole. Review Now, let us review the implications of technology on our civilization here on Earth as a whole. Could the notion of technology possibly have any basis? Simply put, it does not have any credibility of any sort. Technology itself does not signify any concrete object or thing; instead it collectively portrays humyn kind’s achievements as a whole. Any advancements, abilities, creations, undertakings, views, or knowledge of us as humyns are in essence technology. This definition alone refutes the argument that technology is detrimental. Take for instance the three significant technological advances of the humyn race covered in this article: nuclear technology, the internet, and medicine. Nuclear technology, an important advancement for our society, creates a world order, protects the inhabitants of the world, and ensures the longevity, freedoms, and well-being of the entire humyn race. Also, the internet allows for our society to inter-connect and progress further into enlightenment. Perhaps most important of all, medicine, allows for us to ensure our own survival on this planet. These three technologies well represent technology as a whole, and clearly show that technology is extremely beneficial to our society. Only by advocating and advancing technology, can we as humyns, and as humynity, succeed.

#### Mexican pharmaceuticals are key

NAPS 4/11/13 (North American Production Sharing Incorporated, <http://www.napsintl.com/news/index.php/2013/04/11/the-medical-device-industry-manufacturing-in-mexico-has-a-clean-bill-of-health/>)

[Medical device](http://www.napsintl.com/medicaldevice.php) companies manufacturing in Mexico continue to exhibit steady growth with no sign of a slow down in sight. As costs in the United States and Eastern Europe continue to rise, especially with the implementation of “Obamacare” and its direct impact on medical device companies, more organizations are considering [manufacturing in Mexico](http://www.napsintl.com/manufacturinginmexico.php) as a viable solution. No other place in Mexico is this more evident than in Tijuana, where they now claim the largest concentration of medical device companies in all of North America. The ability to provide both timely deliveries and consistently high quality products are a few reasons why medical device manufacturers are choosing Mexico. Also, there is a tremendous base of talented labor with experience in medical device, [automotive](http://www.napsintl.com/auto.php), electronics, aerospace and other sophisticated industries to support the growth of manufacturing in Mexico. Furthermore, the labor laws in Mexico provide companies much more flexibility in terms of compensation, scheduling and seasonality, which plays an important roll on profitability. Another factor drawing medical device manufacturers to Mexico is the government’s enforcement, and employee’s respect, for intellectual property. Unlike many other low-cost manufacturing countries, Mexico is known for its low piracy rates, which cost companies billions of dollars a year. One of the challenges facing these companies is understanding the business landscape and culture in Mexico, which is why many of these firms are choosing to outsource their administration and compliance management to shelter companies. A good shelter company will handle 100% of the administration, including Humyn Resources in Mexico, Payroll in Mexico, Accounting in Mexico, Import/Export in Mexico and Environmental, Health & Safety in Mexico, allowing the manufacturer to focus on production and quality control. “We are receiving a record number of inquires from medical device manufacturers around the world who want to explore Mexico as a competitive solution,” said Scott Stanley, Sr. Vice President of North American Production Sharing, Inc. (NAPS), Tijuana’s largest and most sophisticated shelter service provider. “NAPS guides these companies through the process of feasibility by providing all the facts and figures about expanding into Mexico so sound business decisions can be made. Thereafter, we essentially become partners and typically work together for many years.” With an increase in demand for medical device products, not only in the United States but also within Mexico’s public health sector, Mexico will continue to be the primary choice for medical device manufacturing.

#### Pharmaceuticals is key to the development of DOD non-lethal chemical weapons

The Sunshine Project 03 (“Pentagon Perverts Pharma with New Weapons”, http://www.sunshine-project.org/publications/pr/pr110203.html)

The conventional view is that pharmaceutical research develops new ways to treat disease and reduce humyn suffering; but the Pentagon disagrees. Military weapons developers see the pharmaceutical industry as central to a new generation of anti-personnel weapons. Although it denied such research as recently as the aftermath of the October theater tragedy in Moscow, a Pentagon program has recently released more information that confirms that it wants to make pharmaceutical weapons. And on February 5th, US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld went a big step further. Rumsfeld, himself a former pharmaceutical industry CEO (1), announced that the US is making plans for the use of such incapacitating biochemical weapons in an invasion of Iraq (see News Release, 7 February 2003). The Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate (JNLWD) and the US Army's Soldier Biological Chemical Commynd (SBCCOM) are leading the research. Of interest to the military are drugs that target the brain's regulation of many aspects of cognition, such as sense of pain, consciousness, and emotions like anxiety and fear. JNLWD is preparing a database of pharmaceutical weapons candidates, many of them off-the-shelf products, and indexing them by manufacturer. It will choose drugs from this database for further work and, according to Rumsfeld, if President Bush signs a waiver of existing US policy, they can be used in Iraq. Delivery devices already exist or are in advanced development. These include munitions for an unmynned aerial vehicle or loitering missile, and a new 81mm (bio)chemical mortar round. Many of the Pentagon’s so-called "nonlethal" (bio)chemical weapons candidates are pharmaceuticals. Different names are used for these weapons ("calmatives", "disabling chemicals", "nonlethal chemicals", etc.). Used as weapons, all minimally aim to incapacitate their victims. They belong to the same broad category of agents as the incapacitating chemical that killed more than 120 hostages in the Moscow theater. That agent was reported to be based on fentanyl, an opiate that is also among the weapons being assessed by JNLWD. In the US, pharmaceutical fentanyl is sold by Johnson & Johnson’s subsidiary Janssen Pharmaceutica. Remifentanil, a closely related drug, is a GlaxoSmithKline product. US military contractors have identified a host of other agents manufactured by a Who's Who list of the pharmaceutical industry. In 2001 weapons researchers at the Applied Research Laboratory of Pennsylvania State University assessed the anesthetic drugs isoflurane and sevoflurane, produced by Syngenta and Abbott Laboratories, respectively. The same Penn State team recommended other drugs for "immediate consideration," some of which are in the chart below. The Pentagon is also interested in industry’s new ways to apply (bio)chemicals through the skin and mucous membranes, which could bring previously impractical drug weapons closer to reality by overcoming technical hurdles related to delivery of certain agents.

#### Those are good – prevent collateral damage

Alexander 99, Retired U.S. Army colonel, an author, and a consultant to various U.S. government agencies. He spearheaded the research on nonlethal weapons at Los Alamos National Laboratory, 1999 (John B., Oct 1st, “Nonlethal Weapons: When Deadly Force Is Not Enough”, The Futurist, L/N)

The military and law enforcement situations mentioned so far are fairly clear cut and a logical extension of current practices. However, the future of nonlethal weapons lies in far more important areas. Many of the potential enemies of the future are nontraditional. In the past few years the impact of terrorism and organized crime has been felt around the world. In most cases, response by means of conventional force is unsuitable or inadequate. When the enemy commingles with an innocent civilian population, it is not appropriate, and often counterproductive, to use bombs or missiles to attack them. As was seen earlier this year in Yugoslavia, even precision weapons can occasionally go astray and hit an unintended target. Without the development of advanced nonlethal weapons, the options available to political leaders and military commynders are too limited. It is under circumstances in which lethal weapons could lead to much broader engagements that nonlethal weapons take on strategic importance. An example of a situation that seems to have gone tragically wrong is the 1998 U.S. cruise missile attack on a pharmaceutical company in Sudan. This attack was undertaken based on a belief that the factory was supporting Osama bin Laden, a terrorist who had allegedly instigated and coordinated bombings of the U.S. embassies in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi. The factory, located near the Sudanese capital city of Khartoum, was hit by cruise missiles at night in hopes that civilian casualties would be minimal. It was later learned that the factory was targeted on erroneous information and that people did die in the attack. This incident highlights the limitations of conventional weapons. In the future we need to have weapons that can degrade or destroy such facilities without the collateral damage caused by high explosives. Very few of these weapons are being thoroughly researched. However, with some effort more weapons can be developed to make long-range, nonlethal strikes against terrorist infrastructures.

#### That prevents a world war

Close 98, Arab affairs specialist for the CIA for twenty-six years & an independent consultant on the region, 1998 (Raymond, “The Only Effective Defense Against Terrorism is To Rebuild America's Reputation For Fairness,” The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, November)

Despite U.S. government claims to the contrary, there is, in my opinion, a serious question whether our action in bombing alleged terrorist sites in Afghanistan and Sudan was a justifiable violation of the accepted and respected norms of international law. The attacks were on the sovereign territory of another legally recognized state with which we are technically at peace. We can attempt to justify this action by quoting Osama bin Laden's "declaration of war" on the American government and the American people, without distinction between them. But that is to claim, is it not, that the government of Afghanistan and the government of the Sudan abetted, and therefore share complicity in, acts of war against the United States? In fact, all that Afghanistan seems to have done was to provide Bin Laden with the sanctuary where the acts against us were planned. (Not the location where they were carried out.) We must now be ready to accept the full implications of this interpretation of our international rights. This means, it seems to me, that we are declaring one of two conditions to be true: A. That the United States makes the rules by which it acts in the world community. We are a law unto ourselves. Do we really want to say that? B. Or, that if one state believes it has enemies who are being granted refuge in another country, it is permissible to launch bombing attacks against those elements without the knowledge or permission of the legitimate host government. Is setting that precedent always going to redound to our benefit? Have we thought about that carefully? Most of us accept the premise that terrorism is a phenomenon that cannot be defeated by brute force, but only by ideas, by persuasion, by the amelioration of its causes -- whether real or imagined. Terrorism has only one real asset, in the final analysis -- the passion and commitment of its adherents. Are humyn passions capable of being altered by cruise missiles? Having accepted that premise intellectually as reasonable and civilized, we now have to live with the fact that in other international situations in the future, others may emulate our resort to violence, taking the law into their own hands to launch attacks against other members of the international community if they feel their national interests are similarly threatened. **This is how world wars start.**

#### Mexican manufacturing key to US aerospace

Mecham 7/16 (Michael is apace writer for Gannett News, California Bureau Chief and correspondent for Congress, Aviation Week, 7/16/13, “Mexico’s Welcome Mat Attracts Aerospace Manufacturers”, <http://www.aviationweek.com/Article.aspx?id=/article-xml/AW_04_01_2013_p44-562383.xml>\)

The aerospace influx has not happened overnight. Its roots date to the mid-1970s when U.S. companies, a mix of multinationals and lower-tier suppliers, began sending basic parts manufacturing and assembly tasks across the border, mostly to border towns like Tijuana and Mexicali but also deeper into the country to cities like Monterrey. Service operations followed, as did company research activities. However, it has been in the past decade that Mexico's aerospace manufacturing growth has mushroomed. Political reform led it to pursue a global free trade agenda vigorously and its 1994 signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement (Nafta) benefitted Mexico greatly. Still, it took about a decade for the aerospace sector to take off. Until 2004, growth was scattered, says Queretaro state Gov. Jose Calzada. Not anymore. “We've seen incredible changes in just the last five years,” he says The boom times are a testament to Mexico's geography, its embrace of free trade and adoption of legal mechanisms that provide a “soft landing” for foreign-owned factories. Local leaders clear red tape and amaze U.S. and European executives at how quickly they can put up factories. A typical response comes from Peter Huij, a senior Fokker Aerostructures executive in Chihuahua, about how quickly the company went from bare earth in May 2011 to a completed 75,000-sq.-ft. factory in November: “It would be impossible in Europe.” Behind all of this is Mexico's Maquiladora factory system for supporting foreign companies, which allows them to control their own destiny, importing raw materials such as aerospace-quality alloys, or wiring and then exporting the finished product tax-free. Foreign manufacturers commonly turn to a large service provider—Intermex and American Industries Group are leaders for the aerospace sector—that lease buildings to their clients and handle their human resources, tax and other business needs under Mexican law. About 80% of the aerospace companies in Mexico use such services. Of the 36 Maquiladoras registered by the Mexican government last year, six were in aerospace, including a GKN Aerospace plant in Mexicali, Latecoere in Hermosillo, coatings specialist Ellison Surface Technologies and Rolls-Royce turbine supplier JJ Churchill in Guaymas and a fourth division for Zodiac in Chihuahua. Under the Maquiladora system, Mexico allows resident foreign companies to control 100% of their businesses. They do not face the “local partner” rules so common elsewhere that limit foreigners to a maximum 49% share “They make it easy for you to do business down here,” says John Gardner, strategic program manager at Kaman Aerostructures, another newcomer in Chihuahua. “They provide a 'soft landing,' to get a quick startup—a good startup. We got a lot of support up front and afterward.”

#### Aerospace key to hegemony

Lexington Institute 13

[Public policy think tank, “America Is A Superpower Because It Is An Air Power”, 1/24, <http://www.defense-aerospace.com/article-view/release/142016/air-power-makes-america-a-superpower.html>] \*we don’t defend the gendered discourse of this evidence

There is no question that the United States has the best military in the world. The United States is unique in its ability to project military power to multiple regions of the world simultaneously, conduct multiple major combined and joint operations at a time and both defend the homeland and provide ongoing support to civil agencies. Europe, which spends about sixty percent of the U.S. defense budget and actually has more man and woman in uniform, was unable without significant U.S. support to conduct a single, modest campaign in Libya. The U.S. military continues to set the world standard with respect to most major military systems: nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, large deck amphibious warfare ships, nuclear attack submarines, strategic bombers, fifth-generation fighters, air and missile defenses, tanks and armored fighting vehicles and space and airborne ISR. Even though we don’t talk much about it the military’s cyber warfare capabilities are truly impressive. While the U.S. has the best ground, naval and amphibious forces in the world, one thing makes it a 21st Century superpower: its dominance as an air power. The United States alone is capable of deploying its aerial assets anywhere in the world. U.S. air power can hold at risk any target set in any country and can do so from multiple directions. The U.S. Air Force is the only one capable of delivering specially-designed conventional bombs large enough to destroy deeply buried and hardened structures.  Over the past two decades, the U.S. military has repeatedly demonstrated that it can destroy an adversary’s air force and air defenses in a matter of weeks. After that, hostile ground units were toast. The ability to rapidly seize control of the air means that no soldier has died in an air attack since 1953. Over a decade of wars, American air power from the land and sea provided continual responsive fire support for tactical units on the ground. Other nations have fighters and bombers, although America’s are the best. The U.S. also has the largest and most capable fleets of air transports, refueling aircraft and airborne ISR assets in the world. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Air Force flew soldiers and heavy armor deep into Iraq to seize a critical target, the Haditha Dam. Since 2001, the Air Force has maintained a continuous air bridge to Afghanistan, more than 8,000 miles from CONUS. U.S. C-17 transports are today flying French troops and equipment into Mali. The U.S. Navy has a fleet of fixed wing transports, the C-2 Greyhounds, specifically for the purpose of moving parts and people to and from its aircraft carriers. The United States has crafted an ISR and strategic warning capability based on a sophisticated array of satellites, manned platforms and unmanned aerial systems.  Dominant air power is about much more than just platforms and weapons. It requires also the trained people and processes to plan and manage air operations, process, exploit and disseminate intelligence, identify targets and plan attacks, move supplies and route transports and repair and maintain complex systems. The U.S. had to send hundreds of targeteers to NATO to support the Libyan operation. Over decades, the U.S. military has developed an unequalled training establishment and set of ranges that ensure the highest quality pilots and other personnel. Finally, the U.S. is the dominant air power in the world because of its aerospace industrial base. Whether it is designing and producing fifth-generation fighters such as the F-22 and F-35, providing an advanced tanker like the new KC-46 or inventing high-flying unmanned aerial systems like the Global Hawk, the U.S. aerospace industry continues to set the bar. In addition, the private and public parts of the aerospace industrial base, often working together based on collaborative arrangements such as performance-based logistics contracts, is able to move aircraft, weapons and systems through the nationwide system of depots, Air Logistics Centers and other facilities at a rate unmatched by any other nation. The ability to rapidly repair or overhaul aircraft is itself a force multiplier, providing more aircraft on the flight line to support the warfighters. The U.S. military can go where it is ordered, respond rapidly to the crisis of the moment, move men, equipment and supplies around the world and dominate any place on the face of the earth as long as it desires because it is dominant in the air. As the Pentagon, Congress and the White House struggle with budget issues that could well require deep cuts to the military, they would be well advised to remember that it is air dominance that enables this country to remain a superpower.

#### The pursuit of hegemony is inevitable, sustainable, and prevents great power war

**Ikenberry, Brooks, and Wohlforth 13** – \*Stephen G. Brooks is Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, \*\*John Ikenberry is Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University and Global Eminence Scholar at Kyung Hee University in Seoul, \*\*William C. Wohlforth is Daniel Webster Professor of Government at Dartmouth College (“Lean Forward: In Defense of American Engagement”, January/February 2013, Foreign Affairs, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138468/stephen-g-brooks-g-john-ikenberry-and-william-c-wohlforth/lean-forward)

Of course, even if it is true that the costs of deep engagement fall far below what advocates of retrenchment claim, they would not be worth bearing unless they yielded greater benefits. In fact, they do. The most obvious benefit of the current strategy is that it reduces the risk of a dangerous conflict. The United States' security commitments deter states with aspirations to regional hegemony from contemplating expansion and dissuade U.S. partners from trying to solve security problems on their own in ways that would end up threatening other states. Skeptics discount this benefit by arguing that U.S. security guarantees aren't necessary to prevent dangerous rivalries from erupting. They maintain that the high costs of territorial conquest and the many tools countries can use to signal their benign intentions are enough to prevent conflict. In other words, major powers could peacefully manage regional multipolarity without the American pacifier. But that outlook is too sanguine. If Washington got out of East Asia, Japan and South Korea would likely expand their military capabilities and go nuclear, which could provoke a destabilizing reaction from China. It's worth noting that during the Cold War, both South Korea and Taiwan tried to obtain nuclear weapons; the only thing that stopped them was the United States, which used its security commitments to restrain their nuclear temptations. Similarly, were the United States to leave the Middle East, the countries currently backed by Washington--notably, Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia--might act in ways that would intensify the region's security dilemmas. There would even be reason to worry about Europe. Although it's hard to imagine the return of great-power military competition in a post-American Europe, it's not difficult to foresee governments there refusing to pay the budgetary costs of higher military outlays and the political costs of increasing EU defense cooperation. The result might be a continent incapable of securing itself from threats on its periphery, unable to join foreign interventions on which U.S. leaders might want European help, and vulnerable to the influence of outside rising powers. Given how easily a U.S. withdrawal from key regions could lead to dangerous competition, advocates of retrenchment tend to put forth another argument: that such rivalries wouldn't actually hurt the United States. To be sure, few doubt that the United States could survive the return of conflict among powers in Asia or the Middle East--but at what cost? Were states in one or both of these regions to start competing against one another, they would likely boost their military budgets, arm client states, and perhaps even start regional proxy wars, all of which should concern the United States, in part because its lead in military capabilities would narrow. Greater regional insecurity could also produce cascades of nuclear proliferation as powers such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan built nuclear forces of their own. Those countries' regional competitors might then also seek nuclear arsenals. Although nuclear deterrence can promote stability between two states with the kinds of nuclear forces that the Soviet Union and the United States possessed, things get shakier when there are multiple nuclear rivals with less robust arsenals. As the number of nuclear powers increases, the probability of illicit transfers, irrational decisions, accidents, and unforeseen crises goes up. The case for abandoning the United States' global role misses the underlying security logic of the current approach. By reassuring allies and actively managing regional relations, Washington dampens competition in the world s key areas, thereby preventing the emergence of a hothouse in which countries would grow new military capabilities. For proof that this strategy is working, one need look no further than the defense budgets of the current great powers: on average, since 1991 they have kept their military expenditures as A percentage of GDP to historic lows, and they have not attempted to match the United States' top-end military capabilities. Moreover, all of the world's most modern militaries are U.S. allies, and the United States' military lead over its potential rivals .is by many measures growing. On top of all this, the current grand strategy acts as a hedge against the emergence regional hegemons. Some supporters of retrenchment argue that the U.S. military should keep its forces over the horizon and pass the buck to local powers to do the dangerous work of counterbalancing rising regional powers. Washington, they contend, should deploy forces abroad only when a truly credible contender for regional hegemony arises, as in the cases of Germany and Japan during World War II and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Yet there is already a potential contender for regional hegemony--China--and to balance it, the United States will need to maintain its key alliances in Asia and the military capacity to intervene there. The implication is that the United States should get out of Afghanistan and Iraq, reduce its military presence in Europe, and pivot to Asia. Yet that is exactly what the Obama administration is doing. MILITARY DOMINANCE, ECONOMIC PREEMINENCE Preoccupied with security issues, critics of the current grand strategy miss one of its most important benefits: sustaining an open global economy and a favorable place for the United States within it. To be sure, the sheer size of its output would guarantee the United States a major role in the global economy whatever grand strategy it adopted. Yet the country's military dominance undergirds its economic leadership. In addition to protecting the world economy from instability, its military commitments and naval superiority help secure the sea-lanes and other shipping corridors that allow trade to flow freely and cheaply. Were the United States to pull back from the world, the task of securing the global commons would get much harder. Washington would have less leverage with which it could convince countries to cooperate on economic matters and less access to the military bases throughout the world needed to keep the seas open. A global role also lets the United States structure the world economy in ways that serve its particular economic interests. During the Cold War, Washington used its overseas security commitments to get allies to embrace the economic policies it preferred--convincing West Germany in the 1960s, for example, to take costly steps to support the U.S. dollar as a reserve currency. U.S. defense agreements work the same way today. For example, when negotiating the 2011 free-trade agreement with South Korea, U.S. officials took advantage of Seoul's desire to use the agreement as a means of tightening its security relations with Washington. As one diplomat explained to us privately, "We asked for changes in labor and environment clauses, in auto clauses, and the Koreans took it all." Why? Because they feared a failed agreement would be "a setback to the political and security relationship." More broadly, the United States wields its security leverage to shape the overall structure of the global economy. Much of what the United States wants from the economic order is more of the same: for instance, it likes the current structure of the World Trade Organization and the International Monetary Fund and prefers that free trade continue. Washington wins when U.S. allies favor this status quo, and one reason they are inclined to support the existing system is because they value their military alliances. Japan, to name one example, has shown interest in the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the Obama administration's most important free-trade initiative in the region, less because its economic interests compel it to do so than because Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda believes that his support will strengthen Japan's security ties with the United States. The United States' geopolitical dominance also helps keep the U.S. dollar in place as the world's reserve currency, which confers enormous benefits on the country, such as a greater ability to borrow money. This is perhaps clearest with Europe: the EU'S dependence on the United States for its security precludes the EU from having the kind of political leverage to support the euro that the United States has with the dollar. As with other aspects of the global economy, the United States does not provide its leadership for free: it extracts disproportionate gains. Shirking that responsibility would place those benefits at risk. CREATING COOPERATION What goes for the global economy goes for other forms of international cooperation. Here, too, American leadership benefits many countries but disproportionately helps the United States. In order to counter transnational threats, such as terrorism, piracy, organized crime, climate change, and pandemics, states have to work together and take collective action. But cooperation does not come about effortlessly, especially when national interests diverge. The United States' military efforts to promote stability and its broader leadership make it easier for Washington to launch joint initiatives and shape them in ways that reflect U.S. interests. After all, cooperation is hard to come by in regions where chaos reigns, and it flourishes where leaders can anticipate lasting stability. U.S. alliances are about security first, but they also provide the political framework and channels of communication for cooperation on nonmilitary issues. NATO, for example, has spawned new institutions, such as the Atlantic Council, a think tank, that make it easier for Americans and Europeans to talk to one another and do business. Likewise, consultations with allies in East Asia spill over into other policy issues; for example, when American diplomats travel to Seoul to manage the military alliance, they also end up discussing the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Thanks to conduits such as this, the United States can use bargaining chips in one issue area to make progress in others. The benefits of these communication channels are especially pronounced when it comes to fighting the kinds of threats that require new forms of cooperation, such as terrorism and pandemics. With its alliance system in place, the United States is in a stronger position than it would otherwise be to advance cooperation and share burdens. For example, the intelligence-sharing network within NATO, which was originally designed to gather information on the Soviet Union, has been adapted to deal with terrorism. Similarly, after a tsunami in the Indian Ocean devastated surrounding countries in 2004, Washington had a much easier time orchestrating a fast humanitarian response with Australia, India, and Japan, since their militaries were already comfortable working with one another. The operation did wonders for the United States' image in the region. The United States' global role also has the more direct effect of facilitating the bargains among governments that get cooperation going in the first place. As the scholar Joseph Nye has written, "The American military role in deterring threats to allies, or of assuring access to a crucial resource such as oil in the Persian Gulf, means that the provision of protective force can be used in bargaining situations. Sometimes the linkage may be direct; more often it is a factor not mentioned openly but present in the back of statesmen's minds." THE DEVIL WE KNOW Should America come home? For many prominent scholars of international relations, the answer is yes--a view that seems even wiser in the wake of the disaster in Iraq and the Great Recession. Yet their arguments simply don't hold up. There is little evidence that the United States would save much money switching to a smaller global posture. Nor is the current strategy self-defeating: it has not provoked the formation of counterbalancing coalitions or caused the country to spend itself into economic decline. Nor will it condemn the United States to foolhardy wars in the future. What the strategy does do is help prevent the outbreak of conflict in the world's most important regions, keep the global economy humming, and make international cooperation easier. Charting a different course would threaten all these benefits. This is not to say that the United States' current foreign policy can't be adapted to new circumstances and challenges. Washington does not need to retain every commitment at all costs, and there is nothing wrong with rejiggering its strategy in response to new opportunities or setbacks. That is what the Nixon administration did by winding down the Vietnam War and increasing the United States' reliance on regional partners to contain Soviet power, and it is what the Obama administration has been doing after the Iraq war by pivoting to Asia. These episodes of rebalancing belie the argument that a powerful and internationally engaged America cannot tailor its policies to a changing world. A grand strategy of actively managing global security and promoting the liberal economic order has served the United States exceptionally well for the past six decades, and there is no reason to give it up now. The country's globe-spanning posture is the devil we know, and a world with a disengaged America is the devil we don't know. Were American leaders to choose retrenchment, they would in essence be running a massive experiment to test how the world would work without an engaged and liberal leading power. The results could well be disastrous.

#### Statistics prove heg is effective

**Owen 11** [John Owen, Associate professor in the University of Virginia's Department of Politics, recipient of fellowships from the Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard, and the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford, and the Center of International Studies at Princeton, PhD in international relations from Harvard, February 11, 2011, “Don’t Discount Hegemony, [www.cato-unbound.org/2011/02/11/john-owen/dont-discount-hegemony/](http://www.cato-unbound.org/2011/02/11/john-owen/dont-discount-hegemony/)]

Andrew Mack and his colleagues at the Human Security Report Project are to be congratulated. Not only do they present a study with a striking conclusion, driven by data, free of theoretical or ideological bias, but they also do something quite unfashionable: they bear good news. Social scientists really are not supposed to do that. Our job is, if not to be Malthusians, then at least to point out disturbing trends, looming catastrophes, and the imbecility and mendacity of policy makers. And then it is to say why, if people listen to us, things will get better. We do this as if our careers depended upon it, and perhaps they do; for if all is going to be well, what need then for us? Our colleagues at Simon Fraser University are brave indeed. That may sound like a setup, but it is not. I shall challenge neither the data nor the general conclusion that violent conflict around the world has been decreasing in fits and starts since the Second World War. When it comes to violent conflict among and within countries, things have been getting better. (The trends have not been linear—Figure 1.1 actually shows that the frequency of interstate wars peaked in the 1980s—but the 65-year movement is clear.) Instead I shall accept that Mack et al. are correct on the macro-trends, and focus on their explanations they advance for these remarkable trends. With apologies to any readers of this forum who recoil from academic debates, this might get mildly theoretical and even more mildly methodological. Concerning international wars, one version of the “nuclear-peace” theory is not in fact laid to rest by the data. It is certainly true that nuclear-armed states have been involved in many wars. They have even been attacked (think of Israel), which falsifies the simple claim of “assured destruction”—that any nuclear country A will deter any kind of attack by any country B because B fears a retaliatory nuclear strike from A. But the most important “nuclear-peace” claim has been about mutually assured destruction, which obtains between two robustly nuclear-armed states. The claim is that (1) rational states having second-strike capabilities—enough deliverable nuclear weaponry to survive a nuclear first strike by an enemy—will have an overwhelming incentive not to attack one another; and (2) we can safely assume that nuclear-armed states are rational. It follows that states with a second-strike capability will not fight one another. Their colossal atomic arsenals neither kept the United States at peace with North Vietnam during the Cold War nor the Soviet Union at peace with Afghanistan. But the argument remains strong that those arsenals did help keep the United States and Soviet Union at peace with each other. Why non-nuclear states are not deterred from fighting nuclear states is an important and open question. But in a time when calls to ban the Bomb are being heard from more and more quarters, we must be clear about precisely what the broad trends toward peace can and cannot tell us. They may tell us nothing about why we have had no World War III, and little about the wisdom of banning the Bomb now. Regarding the downward trend in international war, Professor Mack is friendlier to more palatable theories such as the “democratic peace” (democracies do not fight one another, and the proportion of democracies has increased, hence less war);the interdependence or “commercial peace” (states with extensive economic ties find it irrational to fight one another, and interdependence has increased, hence less war); and the notion that people around the world are more anti-war than their forebears were. Concerning the downward trend in civil wars, he favors theories of economic growth (where commerce is enriching enough people, violence is less appealing—a logic similar to that of the “commercial peace” thesis that applies among nations) and the end of the Cold War (which end reduced superpower support for rival rebel factions in so many Third-World countries). These are all plausible mechanisms for peace. What is more, none of them excludes any other; all could be working toward the same end. That would be somewhat puzzling, however. Is the world just lucky these days? How is it that an array of peace-inducing factors happens to be working coincidentally in our time, when such a magical array was absent in the past? The answer may be that one or more of these mechanisms reinforces some of the others, or perhaps some of them are mutually reinforcing. Some scholars, for example, have been focusing on whether economic growth might support democracy and vice versa, and whether both might support international cooperation, including to end civil wars. We would still need to explain how this charmed circle of causes got started, however. And here let me raise another factor, perhaps even less appealing than the “nuclear peace” thesis, at least outside of the United States. That factor is what international relations scholars call hegemony—specifically American hegemony. A theory that many regard as discredited, but that refuses to go away, is called hegemonic stability theory. The theory emerged in the 1970s in the realm of international political economy. It asserts that for the global economy to remain open—for countries to keep barriers to trade and investment low—one powerful country must take the lead. Depending on the theorist we consult, “taking the lead” entails paying for global public goods (keeping the sea lanes open, providing liquidity to the international economy), coercion (threatening to raise trade barriers or withdraw military protection from countries that cheat on the rules), or both. The theory is skeptical that international cooperation in economic matters can emerge or endure absent a hegemon. The distastefulness of such claims is self-evident: they imply that it is good for everyone the world over if one country has more wealth and power than others. More precisely, they imply that it has been good for the world that the United States has been so predominant. There is no obvious reason why hegemonic stability theory could not apply to other areas of international cooperation, including in security affairs, human rights, international law, peacekeeping (UN or otherwise), and so on. What I want to suggest here—suggest, not test—is that American hegemony might just be a deep cause of the steady decline of political deaths in the world. How could that be? After all, the report states that United States is the third most war-prone country since 1945. Many of the deaths depicted in Figure 10.4 were in wars that involved the United States (the Vietnam War being the leading one). Notwithstanding politicians’ claims to the contrary, a candid look at U.S. foreign policy reveals that the country is as ruthlessly self-interested as any other great power in history. The answer is that U.S. hegemony might just be a deeper cause of the proximate causes outlined by Professor Mack. Consider economic growth and openness to foreign trade and investment, which (so say some theories) render violence irrational. American power and policies may be responsible for these in two related ways. First, at least since the 1940s Washington has prodded other countries to embrace the market capitalism that entails economic openness and produces sustainable economic growth. The United States promotes capitalism for selfish reasons, of course: its own domestic system depends upon growth, which in turn depends upon the efficiency gains from economic interaction with foreign countries, and the more the better. During the Cold War most of its allies accepted some degree of market-driven growth. Second, the U.S.-led western victory in the Cold War damaged the credibility of alternative paths to development—communism and import-substituting industrialization being the two leading ones—and left market capitalism the best model. The end of the Cold War also involved an end to the billions of rubles in Soviet material support for regimes that tried to make these alternative models work. (It also, as Professor Mack notes, eliminated the superpowers’ incentives to feed civil violence in the Third World.) What we call globalization is caused in part by the emergence of the United States as the global hegemon.

# 2ac

## Topicality

#### "Substantial" means actually existing, real, or belonging to substance

Words and Phrases 2 (Volume 40A) p. 460

Ala. 1909. “Substantial” means “belonging to substance; actually existing; real; \*\*\* not seeming or imaginary; not elusive; real; solid; true; veritable

#### “Substantial” requires a certain mandate

Words and Phrases 64 (40W&P 759)

The words" outward, open, actual, visible, substantial, and exclusive," in connection with a change of possession, mean substantially the same thing. They mean not concealed; not hidden; exposed to view; free from concealment, dissimulation, reserve, or disguise; in full existence; denoting that which not merely can be, but is opposed to potential, apparent, constructive, and imaginary; veritable; genuine; certain: absolute: real at present time, as a matter of fact, not merely nominal; opposed to form; actually existing; true; not including, admitting, or pertaining to any others; undivided; sole; opposed to inclusive.

## Counterplan

### 2ac – mexico says no

#### Say no – perceived as interference in domestic affairs

Starr 9 - director of the U.S.-Mexico Network and an associate professor of teaching in the School of International Relations and in Public Diplomacy

(Pamela, “Mexico and the United States: A window of opportunity?,” http://www.pacificcouncil.org/document.doc?id=35)

Beyond the current economic crisis, the United States can best promote regional ¶ economic competitiveness in three ways. First, it should remain patient through what is ¶ destined to be a slow process of economic reform and policy adjustment in Mexico. As ¶ Mexico struggles to implement these changes, “advice” coming from Washington would be ¶ seen as unwarranted interference in Mexican domestic affairs and thus be counterproductive. ¶ Second, President Obama’s stated desire to augment significantly the U.S. budget for ¶ economic aid should include an increase in targeted assistance programs for Mexico. This ¶ effort should focus on two of the primary obstacles to growth in the Mexican economy – an ¶ inadequately educated workforce and insufficient infrastructure. It could do this by increasing ¶ current U.S. programs to train rural teachers, provide student scholarships, and determine the ¶ feasibility of large infrastructure projects, and by focusing overall on efforts that complement private sector investment and Mexican government programs.

### Perm Do CP

Perm Do CP – Conditioning is intrinsic part of Aff

Caballero et. Al No date – (José, Maria, Materne, “International Trade: Some Basic Theories and Concepts”, FAO, [http://www.fao.org/docrep/003/x7352e/x7352e02.htm)](http://www.fao.org/docrep/003/x7352e/x7352e02.htm%29)

In general, policy-makers do not make trade concessions without a quid pro quo. There is a history of international trade negotiations (and wars) of many centuries behind this. GATT/WTO negotiations are a modern system to discuss and agree on these quid pro quo in an organized and consistent manner. It is interesting that, while mainstream theoretical economists have traditionally focused on the gains from trade, implicitly or openly advocating the unilateral dismantling of trade barriers, policy-makers and practically-oriented policy economists have seen the matter in terms of reciprocal concessions [9](http://www.fao.org/docrep/003/x7352e/x7352e02.htm#comm9) . This is probably due to a better understanding by policy-makers and practical economists of the imperfections and extra-economic features present in the operation of markets, as well as policy-makers' exposure to pressures from political constituencies who may suffer from international competition.

### 2ac – congress key

#### Doesn’t solve – congressional jurisdiction

US COTA 91 – Congress Office of Technology Assessment (“Redesigning Defense: Planning the Transition to the Future U.S. Defense Industrial Base”, OTA-ISC-500, July 1991, http://ota-cdn.fas.org/reports/9134.pdf)//javi

The objective of greater NADIB integration would be to rationalize defense production within the North American continent by enabling both countries to specialize in the areas where they are most proficient. Congress could help achieve this goal by removing some or all of the existing legislative and policy barriers to free trade in defense and dual-use products between the two countries and by appropriating funds for the codevelopment and coproduction of defense equipment by U.S. and Canadian firms. The repeal of U.S. protectionist legislation might be made conditional on Ottawa’s willingness to drop its offset requirements. Such congressional action would need to be supplemented with additional measures by the executive branch. For example, the U.S. and Canadian defense departments might seek improved coordination in defense R&D policy and a more liberal policy on cross-border transfers of technology so that the research of both countries could be utilized more efficiently. Joint U.S.-Canadian industrial preparedness planning might also be expanded.

### 1nc – at: war I/L

#### Democracy doesn’t solve war

**Taner 02** (Binner, PhD Candidate – Syracuse U., Alternatives: Turkish Journal of Int’l Relations, 1(3), p. 43-44, http://www.alternativesjournal.com/binnur.pdf)

The discussion above suggests that the most important drawback of the “democratic peace” theory is the essentialization of the political regime as the only factor contributing to international peace and war. The ‘democratic peace’ theory underemphasizes, and most often neglects, the importance of other domestic factors such as political culture,35 degree of development, socio-economic and military considerations,36 the role of interest-groups and other domestic constituencies,37 strategic culture38 among others in decision-making. In other words, it is easily the case that the “democratic peace theory” lacks sensitivity to context and decisionmaking process. Although one should not dispute the fact that domestic political structure/regime type is an important component of any analysis of war and peace, this should be seen as only one of domestic variables, not necessarily the variable. Devoid of an analysis that gives respect to a number of other factors, superficial and sweeping generalizations will leave **many details in decision-making unaccounted for**. Consequently, although “democratic peace” theory should not be discarded entirely, current emphasis on the importance of “democracy” in eliminating bloody conflicts in the world should not blind scholars and policy circles alike to the fact that “democratic peace” is theoretically and empirically overdetermined.

## K

### 2ac – framework

#### The Role of the Ballot is to simulate the enactment of the plan—effective choices regarding Latin American foreign policy require the ability to test the real world outcomes of our scholarship and advocacies.

Baxter 10 (Jorge, Education Specialist, Department of Education and Culture in the Organization of American States, Former Coordinator of the Inter-American Program on Education for Democratic Values and Practices at the OAS, PHD in International Comparative Education and Policy from University of Maryland College Park, “Towards a Deliberative and Democratic Model of International Cooperation in Education in Latin America”, Inter-American Journal of Education for Democracy, 3(2), 224-254, <https://scholarworks.iu.edu/journals/index.php/ried/article/viewFile/1016/1307>, Accessed: 7/30/13)OG

In the context of international¶ education cooperation and international¶ development in Latin America, where**¶** there are great asymmetries in power and¶ resources, it seems that this critique could¶ have some validity. However, rather than**¶** concluding that deliberation and participation**¶** should be reduced, one could conclude (as¶ is argued in this paper) that they should**¶** be enhanced and expanded. Those that¶ advocate for a “thicker” democratization in¶ the region would likely advocate for a more**¶** substantive approach to deliberation in policy¶ which establishes certain parameters such¶ as “education is an intrinsic human right,”¶ and which would place an emphasis on¶ achieving quality education outcomes¶ for all as the goal. This does not mean that¶ they would not advocate for deliberation but¶ rather would set parameters for deliberation¶ in order to ensure that the outcomes do not¶ lead to “unjust” policy (e.g., a policy that¶ might promote more inequity in education).¶ Those that advocate for a “thinner” approach¶ to democratization would tend to advocate¶ for a procedural approach to deliberation in¶ education policy and would most likely place¶ emphasis on equal opportunity of access¶ to quality education.¶ Instability critique: Education in Latin¶ America suffers from too much instability and¶ is too politicized. Increasing participation and¶ deliberation would only further politicize the¶ situation and polarize those who advocate for¶ educational reform and those who block it.¶ The average term of a minister of education¶ is one-and-a-half years; each time a new¶ minister comes to office, new policies are¶ passed which, according to deliberative¶ democratic theory, would need to be reasoned¶ and debated with citizens. Deliberation in this¶ context would promote even more instability¶ and would lead to further politicization of¶ education reform.¶ Response: Political instability and¶ lack of continuity in policy reform are serious¶ limitations that to some degree are inherent¶ in democratic institutions and processes. The¶ reality is that if any education reform is to¶ succeed in the long term, it needs more than¶ the efforts of governments or international¶ organizations. It needs the sustained support¶ of stakeholders across sectors (public,¶ private, and civil society) and over time. It¶ has been argued that the main problem in¶ basic education in Latin America is the lack¶ of a broad social consensus, recognizing¶ that there is a problem of equity and quality¶ in the provision of education (Schiefelbein,¶ 1997). This lack of broad social consensus¶ is especially challenging where there is, as¶ noted in the critique, a lack of continuity¶ in education reform. Reform in education¶ takes time, sometimes decades. Ensuring¶ continuity in education reform policies is¶ therefore crucial, and this requires public¶ consensus. Deliberative forums convening**¶** government, private sector, and civil society**¶** groups can contribute to developing this public**¶** consensus and to providing more continuity**¶** in policy. Deliberative forums combined**¶** with collaborative projects can help promote**¶** learning, distribute institutional memory,**¶** support capacity-building efforts, and bring**¶** more resources to bear on the education**¶** reform process. Creating a space for citizens¶ to deliberate on the role of education is¶ fundamental for promoting broad social¶ consensus around education reforms. In Latin**¶** America, the most innovative and successful**¶** reforms have all created multiple and**¶** continuous opportunities for diverse groups**¶** across the education sector and society to¶ provide input and to have opportunities for¶ meaningful collaborative action. International¶ organizations, leveraging their regional and¶ international position, can contribute by¶ promoting policy dialogue and collaborative¶ actions among ministries and also with key¶ stakeholders across sectors. The challenge¶ is to develop a better understanding of how¶ deliberation can be used to promote more¶ collaborative as opposed to more adversarial¶ and partisan forms of politics. This is perhaps¶ one area which deliberative theorists need to¶ explore more.¶ 5. Power critique: The final critique relates¶ the possibility that increasing deliberation¶ and participation can lead to increased¶ inequality. Fung and Wright (2003) note¶ that deliberation can turn into domination¶ in a context where “participants in these¶ processes usually face each other from¶ unequal positions of power.” Every reform**¶** in education creates winners and losers, and**¶** very few create “win-win” situations. Those¶ in power would have to submit to the rules of¶ deliberation and relinquish “control” over the¶ various dimensions of democratic decisionmaking.¶ This is naïve and not politically¶ feasible.¶ Response: This is a valid critique¶ worth considering. Structural inequalities**¶** and asymmetries of power in governments**¶** and international institutions in Latin America**¶** have facilitated domination by elites in terms**¶** of authority, power, and control in politics.**¶** Asymmetries of power in international¶ cooperation in education are also clear,¶ especially when powerful financial (World¶ Bank, IDB, IMF) or political (OAS, UNESCO)¶ organizations engage with local stakeholders¶ and condition policy options with funding¶ or political support. What this paper has¶ argued is relevant again here: that instead of**¶** rejecting further democratization in the face**¶** of these challenges, including the challenge**¶** of elite “domination,” what is needed is more**¶** and better democracy, defined in terms of its**¶** breadth, depth, range, and control. Finally,¶ dealing with elite domination in international**¶** deliberative forums will require conscious and¶ skilled facilitation on the part of international¶ organizations, which themselves are often¶ elitist and hegemonic.¶ Final Thoughts: So What?¶ Perhaps the most critical question¶ that emerges in the argument for increased¶ democratization and deliberation is simply:¶ So what? Does increased democratization and¶ deliberation actually lead to better outcomes¶ in education? More empirical research on this¶ critical question is needed. However, experiments**¶** in deliberative democracy in education reform¶ in Brazil through the UNESCO and Ministry of¶ Education Coordinated Action Plan and Porto¶ Alegre‘s Citizen School, and also to some degree¶ at the international level with the OAS pilot¶ experiment in developing a more democratic¶ model of international cooperation from 2001-¶ 2005, have shown that deliberative processes**¶** can enhance learning on the part of those**¶** participating. Fung and Wright (2003) refer to¶ these experiments in deliberation as “schools¶ of democracy” because participants exercise**¶** their capacities of argument, planning, and¶ evaluation. Deliberation promotes joint reflection¶ and consideration of others’ views. Citizens**¶** who participate in deliberative forums develop**¶** competencies that are important not only for**¶** active citizenship (listening, communication,¶ problem-solving, conflict resolution, selfregulation skills) but also crucial for managing**¶** change and school reform. Many of the same**¶** skills that are developed through citizen**¶** deliberation and participation are also essential**¶** for transforming school cultures, promoting**¶** “learning organizations” (Senge, 2000), fostering**¶** communities of reflective practitioners (Schon,¶ 1991) and developing communities of practice**¶** (Wenger, 2001). There is evidence from some¶ research that democratic interactions can create**¶** knowledge that is more rigorous, precise, and**¶** relevant than that produced in authoritarian**¶** environments (Jaramillo, 2005). Another¶ important aspect of enhancing deliberative¶ democracy and democratization is that it moves¶ from a focus on individuals and their own¶ preferences towards more collective forms of¶ learning and collaboration.¶ Up to now, international organizations¶ have endorsed a “thin” version of democratization¶ that is content with formal and centralized¶ mechanisms of “representation” and “policy¶ dialogue.” If a new, more deliberative and¶ democratic model of cooperation in education in¶ the region were to emerge, what would it look¶ like?¶ First of all, a more deliberative and¶ democratic model of international cooperation in¶ education would involve more direct and deeper**¶** forms of participation from everyday citizens,**¶** including teachers, school directors, families,¶ school communities, students, and mesolevel**¶** actors such as civil society organizations.**¶** This participation would move beyond simple**¶** consultation to more authentic forms of joint**¶** decision-making and deliberation. The model¶ would involve more accountability on the¶ part of international organizations in terms¶ of transparency, and would require injecting**¶** ethical reasoning into policies and programming.¶ In addition, a new more democratic model of**¶** international cooperation would expand the**¶** range of policy options available to countries**¶** through devolution of authority, power, and¶ control, combined with oversight and horizontal¶ accountability mechanisms. A more democratic**¶** model of international cooperation would stress**¶** valuing, systematizing, and disseminating**¶** local knowledge and innovation. Finally,**¶** democratization and deliberation in international**¶** cooperation in education would lead to enhanced**¶** learning and agency on the part of participating**¶** countries, groups, and individuals, and thus**¶** contribute to better outcomes in terms of quality**¶** and equity in education at national and local¶ levels.

#### Debating about policy towards Latin America is valuable – without it change is impossible and their discourse gets coopted

Ried Ijed ’10- Ried Ijed is the Revista interamericana de Educación para la Democracia Interamerican Journal of Education for Democracy, (“Towards a Deliberative and Democratic Model of International Cooperation in Education in Latin America”, Vol 3 No. 2, December 2010)

While the discourse of international organizations has changed over the past decade to emphasize more local participation, there continues to be a disjuncture between “explicit” statements embodying democratic values and ideals, and the actual practices within these organizations (Samoff, 2004). There are potentially several factors (both political and technical) that lead to disjuncture between policy and practice. Among the most commonly cited of political factors is the tendency for international organizations to co-opt discourses about participation in order to gain legitimacy, but without showing any real commitment to a democratic transformation and the devolution of power, authority, and control (see Klees, 2002). Democratization policies in these contexts are merely “symbolic,” in that at a public level the problem is recognized but at the implementation level they are neither supported with adequate resources nor sufficiently specific enough to be operationalized (Stromquist, 2003). Technical factors may include the inherent limitations on representation in democratic processes, or the lack of financial resources, technical know- how, and skills required to implement changes and mechanisms that would allow for more democratic participation.

#### PDB- resolves the impulse of violence

### 2ac – biopolitics turn

**Their K creates a world without political enmity – creates a terrifying system without an exterior – enemies re-appear in internalized struggles – that causes worse biopolitical violence**

**Prozorov 06** /Professor of International Relations at Petrozavodsk State University, Russia/ [Sergei, “Liberal Enmity: The Figure of the Foe in the Political Ontology of Liberalism”, Millennium - Journal of International Studies]

Schmitt’s concern with the liberal effacement of pluralism in the name of cosmopolitan humanity does not merely seek to unravel hypocrisy or ridicule inconsistency but has more serious implications in the context of the transcendental function of enmity that we have introduced above. For Schmitt, the ‘pluriversal’ structure of international relations accords with his political ontology that affirms the ineradicability of difference, from which, as we have discussed, Schmitt infers the ever-present ‘extreme possibility’ and the demand for the decision on the enemy. Moreover, the actual pluriversal structure of international relations satisfies the criterion of equality between the Self and the Other by precluding the emergence of a global hierarchy, whereby a particular ‘concrete order’ lays a claim to represent humanity at large. While this pluralism does nothing to eliminate the ‘most extreme possibility’ of violent conflict, it may be said at least to suspend it in its potentiality by retaining the possibility that the ‘existentially different and alien’ might not become the enemy simply by remaining outside the ‘concrete order’ of the Self and thus positing no actual existential threat. Moreover, as long as the boundary between the Self and the Other is present, there remains a possibility that whatever conflicts may ensue from the irreducible ontological alterity, they may be resolved on the basis of the mutually recognised sovereign equality of the Self and the Other in the domain of the international, which by definition is effaced by any political unification of humanity.43 Thus, for Schmitt ‘it is an intellectual historical misunderstanding of an astonishing kind to want to dissolve these plural political entities in response to the call of universal and monistic representations, and to designate that as pluralist’.44 However, this dissolution of actually existing pluralism is not a mere misunderstanding, a logical fallacy of presupposing the existence of the unity that is yet to be established. In an invective that we consider crucial for understanding Schmitt’s critique of liberal ultra-politics, Schmitt approaches liberal monism with an almost existential trepidation: ‘What would be terrifying is a world in which there no longer existed an exterior but only a homeland, no longer a space for measuring and testing one’s strength freely.’45 Why is a world in which there is ‘only a homeland’, a Wendtian ‘world state’, posited as outright terrifying, rather than objectionable on a variety of political, economic, moral or aesthetic grounds? The answer is evident from the perspective of Schmitt’s ontology of alterity and the affirmation of the ‘extreme possibility’ of existential negation. If alterity is ontological and thus ineradicable in any empirical sense, then the establishment of a ‘domesticated’ world unity, a global homeland, does nothing to diminish the danger of the advent of the Other, but, on the contrary, incorporates radical alterity within the ‘homeland’ of the Self so that the ever-present possibility of violent death can no longer be externalised to the domain of the international. The monistic disavowal of alterity, of the ‘existentially different and alien’, is thus terrifying as it enhances the ‘most extreme possibility’ of killing and being killed. Schmitt’s objection to the liberal monism of the ‘homeland of humanity’ is therefore two-fold. First, the effacement of ontological pluralism, which subsumes radical alterity under the ‘universal homeland’, must logically entail the suppression of difference through the 3: ‘Since even a world state would not be a closed system, it would always be vulnerable to temporary disruptions. However, a world state would differ from anarchy in that it would constitute such disruptions as crime, not as politics or history. The possibility of crime may always be with us, but it does not constitute a stable alternative to a world state.’47 Thus, struggles against hegemony or domination, which indeed have constituted politics and history as we know them, are recast as a priori criminal acts in the new order of the world state, calling for global police interventions rather than interstate war. ‘The adversary is no longer called an enemy, but a disturber of peace and is thereby designated to be an outlaw of humanity.’48 The exclusionary potential of universalism is evident: theoretically, we may easily envision a situation where a ‘world state’ as a global police structure does not represent anything but itself; not merely anyone, but ultimately everyone may be excluded from the ‘world unity’ without any consequences for the continuing deployment of this abstract universality as an instrument of legitimation. In Zygmunt Bauman’s phrase, ‘the “international community” has little reality apart from the occasional military operations undertaken in its name’.49 Thus, for Schmitt, if the monistic project of liberalism ever succeeded, it would be at the cost of the transformation of the world

### 2ac – security good – pragmatism

#### Foreign policy should be guided by a mix of moral and self-interested motivations – the alt’s absolutism causes paralysis and incoherence that creates more violence

George Friedman - founder, chief intelligence officer, and CEO of Stratfor – 12/6/11, Egypt and the Idealist-Realist Debate in U.S. Foreign Policy, http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20111205-egypt-and-idealist-realist-debate-us-foreign-policy?utm\_source=freelist-f&utm\_medium=email&utm\_campaign=20111206&utm\_term=gweekly&utm\_content=readmore&elq=88a5097c3a284763b9202918890c5a91

Western countries, following the principles of the French Revolution, have two core beliefs. The first is the concept of national self-determination, the idea that all nations (and what the term “nation” means is complex in itself) have the right to determine for themselves the type of government they wish. The second is the idea of human rights, which are defined in several documents but are all built around the basic values of individual rights, particularly the right not only to participate in politics but also to be free in your private life from government intrusion. The first principle leads to the idea of the democratic foundations of the state. The second leads to the idea that the state must be limited in its power in certain ways and the individual must be free to pursue his own life in his own way within a framework of law limited by the principles of liberal democracy. The core assumption within this is that a democratic polity will yield a liberal constitution. This assumes that the majority of the citizens, left to their own devices, will favor the Enlightenment’s definition of human rights. This assumption is simple, but its application is tremendously complex. In the end, the premise of the Western project is that national self-determination, expressed through free elections, will create and sustain constitutional democracies. It is interesting to note that human rights activists and neoconservatives, who on the surface are ideologically opposed, actually share this core belief. Both believe that democracy and human rights flow from the same source and that creating democratic regimes will create human rights. The neoconservatives believe outside military intervention might be an efficient agent for this. Human rights groups oppose this, preferring to organize and underwrite democratic movements and use measures such as sanctions and courts to compel oppressive regimes to cede power. But they share common ground on this point as well. Both groups believe that outside intervention is needed to facilitate the emergence of an oppressed public naturally inclined toward democracy and human rights. This, then, yields a theory of foreign policy in which the underlying strategic principle must not only support existing constitutional democracies but also bring power to bear to weaken oppressive regimes and free the people to choose to build the kind of regimes that reflect the values of the European Enlightenment. Complex Questions and Choices The case of Egypt raises an interesting and obvious question regardless of how it all turns out. What if there are democratic elections and the people choose a regime that violates the principles of Western human rights? What happens if, after tremendous Western effort to force democratic elections, the electorate chooses to reject Western values and pursue a very different direction — for example, one that regards Western values as morally reprehensible and aims to make war against them? One obvious example of this is Adolf Hitler, whose ascent to power was fully in keeping with the processes of the Weimar Republic — a democratic regime — and whose clearly stated intention was to supersede that regime with one that was popular (there is little doubt that the Nazi regime had vast public support), opposed to constitutionalism in the democratic sense and hostile to constitutional democracy in other countries. The idea that the destruction of repressive regimes opens the door for democratic elections that will not result in another repressive regime, at least by Western standards, assumes that all societies find Western values admirable and want to emulate them. This is sometimes the case, but the general assertion is a form of narcissism in the West that assumes that all reasonable people, freed from oppression, would wish to emulate us. At this moment in history, the obvious counterargument rests in some, but not all, Islamist movements. We do not know that the Islamist groups in Egypt will be successful, and we do not know what ideologies they will pursue, but they are Islamists and their views of man and moral nature are different from those of the European Enlightenment. Islamists have a principled disagreement with the West on a wide range of issues, from the relation of the individual to the community to the distinction between the public and private sphere. They oppose the Egyptian military regime not only because it limits individual freedom but also because it violates their understanding of the regime’s moral purpose. The Islamists have a different and superior view of moral political life, just as Western constitutional democracies see their own values as superior. The collision between the doctrine of national self-determination and the Western notion of human rights is not an abstract question but an extremely practical one for Europe and the United States. Egypt is the largest Arab country and one of the major centers of Islamic life. Since 1952, it has had a secular and military-run government. Since 1973, it has had a pro-Western government. At a time when the United States is trying to end its wars in the Islamic world (along with its NATO partners, in the case of Afghanistan), and with relations with Iran already poor and getting worse, the democratic transformation of Egypt into a radical Islamic regime would shift the balance of power in the region wildly. This raises questions regarding the type of regime Egypt has, whether it is democratically elected and whether it respects human rights. Then there is the question of how this new regime might affect the United States and other countries. The same can be said, for example, about Syria, where an oppressive regime is resisting a movement that some in the West regard as democratic. It may be, but its moral principles might be anathema to the West. At the same time, the old repressive regime might be unpopular but more in the interests of the West. Then pose this scenario: Assume there is a choice between a repressive, undemocratic regime that is in the interests of a Western country and a regime that is democratic but repressive by Western standards and hostile to those interests. Which is preferable, and what steps should be taken? These are blindingly complex questions that some observers — the realists as opposed to the idealists — say not only are unanswerable but also undermine the ability to pursue national interests without in any way improving the moral character of the world. In other words, you are choosing between two types of repression from a Western point of view and there is no preference. Therefore, a country like the United States should ignore the moral question altogether and focus on a simpler question, and one that’s answerable: the national interest. Egypt is an excellent place to point out the tension within U.S. foreign policy between idealists, who argue that pursuing Enlightenment principles is in the national interest, and realists, who argue that the pursuit of principles is very different from their attainment. You can wind up with regimes that are neither just nor protective of American interests. In other words, the United States can wind up with a regime hostile to the United States and oppressive by American standards. Far from a moral improvement, this would be a practical disaster. Mission and Power There is a temptation to accept the realist argument. Its weakness is that its definition of the national interest is never clear. The physical protection of the United States is obviously an issue — and given 9/11, it is not a trivial matter. At the same time, the physical safety of the United States is not always at stake. What exactly is our interest in Egypt, and does it matter to us whether it is pro-American? There are answers to this but not always obvious ones, and the realists frequently have trouble defining the national interest. Even if we accept the idea that the primary objective of U.S. foreign policy is securing the national interest irrespective of moral considerations, what exactly is the national interest? It seems to me that two principles emerge. The first is that having no principles beyond “interest” is untenable. Interest seems very tough-minded, but it is really a vapid concept when you drill into it. The second principle is that there can be no moral good without power. Proclaiming a principle without having the power to pursue it is a form of narcissism. You know you are doing no good, but talking about it makes you feel superior. Interest is not enough, and morality without power is mere talk. So what is to be done about Egypt? The first thing is to recognize that little can be done, not because it would be morally impermissible but because, practically, Egypt is a big country that is hard to influence, and meddling and failing is worse than doing nothing at all. Second, it must be understood that Egypt matters and the outcome of this affair, given the past decade, is not a matter to which the United States can afford to be indifferent. An American strategy on Egypt — one that goes beyond policy papers in Washington — is hard to define. But a number of points can be deduced from this exercise. First, it is essential to not create myths. The myth of the Egyptian revolution was that it was going to create a constitutional democracy like Western democracies. That simply wasn’t the issue on the table. The issue was between the military regime and an Islamist regime. This brings us to the second point, which is that sometimes, in confronting two different forms of repression, the issue is to select the one that is most in the national interest. This will force you to define the national interest, to a salutary effect. Washington, like all capitals, likes policies and hates political philosophy. The policies frequently fail to come to grips with reality because the policymakers don’t grasp the philosophical implications. The contradiction inherent in the human rights and the neoconservative approach is one thing, but the inability of the realists to define with rigor what the national interest is creates policy papers of monumental insignificance. Both sides create polemics as a substitute for thought. It’s in places like Egypt where this reality is driven home. One side really believed that Egypt would become like Minnesota. The other side knew it wouldn’t and devised a plan to be tough-minded — but not tough-minded enough to define what the point of the plan was. This is the crisis of U.S. foreign policy. It has always been there, but given American power, it is one that creates global instability. One part of the American regime wants to be just; the other part wants to be tough. Neither realizes that such a distinction is the root of the problem. Look at the American (and European) policy toward Egypt and I think you can see the predicament.

### 2ac – threats real

#### Literature and psychological bias runs towards threat deflation- we are the opposite of paranoid

**Schweller 04** [Randall L. Schweller, Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at The Ohio State University, “Unanswered Threats A Neoclassical RealistTheory of Underbalancing,” International Security 29.2 (2004) 159-201, Muse]

Despite the historical frequency of underbalancing, little has been written on the subject. Indeed, Geoffrey Blainey's memorable observation that for "every thousand pages published on the causes of wars there is less than one page directly on the causes of peace" could have been made with equal veracity about overreactions to threats as opposed to underreactions to them.92 Library shelves are filled with books on the causes and dangers of exaggerating threats, ranging from studies of domestic politics to bureaucratic politics, to political psychology, to organization theory. By comparison, there have been few studies at any level of analysis or from any theoretical perspective that directly explain why states have with some, if not equal, regularity underestimated dangers to their survival. There may be some cognitive or normative bias at work here. Consider, for instance, that there is a commonly used word, paranoia, for the unwarranted fear that people are, in some way, "out to get you" or are planning to do oneharm. I suspect that just as many people are afflicted with the opposite psychosis: the delusion that everyone loves you when, in fact, they do not even like you. Yet, we do not have a familiar word for this phenomenon. Indeed, I am unaware of any word that describes this pathology (hubris and overconfidence come close, but they plainly define something other than what I have described). That noted, international relations theory does have a frequently used phrase for the pathology of states' underestimation of threats to their survival, the so-called Munich analogy. The term is used, however, in a disparaging way by theorists to ridicule those who employ it. The central claim is that the naïveté associated with Munich and the outbreak of World War II has become an overused and inappropriate analogy because few leaders are as evil and unappeasable as Adolf Hitler. Thus, the analogy either mistakenly causes leaders [End Page 198] to adopt hawkish and overly competitive policies or is deliberately used by leaders to justify such policies and mislead the public. A more compelling explanation for the paucity of studies on underreactions to threats, however, is the tendency of theories to reflect contemporary issues as well as the desire of theorists and journals to provide society with policy- relevant theories that may help resolve or manage urgent security problems. Thus, born in the atomic age with its new balance of terror and an ongoing Cold War, the field of security studies has naturally produced theories of and prescriptions for national security that have had little to say about—and are, in fact, heavily biased against warnings of—the dangers of underreacting to or underestimating threats. After all, the nuclear revolution was not about overkill but, as Thomas Schelling pointed out, speed of kill and mutual kill.93 Given the apocalyptic consequences of miscalculation, accidents, or inadvertent nuclear war, small wonder that theorists were more concerned about overreacting to threats than underresponding to them. At a time when all of humankind could be wiped out in less than twenty-five minutes, theorists may be excused for stressing the benefits of caution under conditions of uncertainty and erring on the side of inferring from ambiguous actions overly benign assessments of the opponent's intentions. The overwhelming fear was that a crisis "might unleash forces of an essentially military nature that overwhelm the political process and bring on a war thatnobody wants. Many important conclusions about the risk of nuclear war, and thus about the political meaning of nuclear forces, rest on this fundamental idea."94 Now that the Cold War is over, we can begin to redress these biases in the literature. In that spirit, I have offered a domestic politics model to explain why threatened states often fail to adjust in a prudent and coherent way to dangerous changes in their strategic environment. The model fits nicely with recent realist studies on imperial under- and overstretch. Specifically, it is consistent with Fareed Zakaria's analysis of U.S. foreign policy from 1865 to 1889, when, he claims, the United States had the national power and opportunity to expand but failed to do so because it lacked sufficient state power (i.e., the state was weak relative to society).95 Zakaria claims that the United States did [End Page 199] not take advantage of opportunities in its environment to expand because it lacked the institutional state strength to harness resources from society that were needed to do so. I am making a similar argument with respect to balancing rather than expansion: incoherent, fragmented states are unwilling and unable to balance against potentially dangerous threats because elites view the domestic risks as too high, and they are unable to mobilize the required resources from a divided society. The arguments presented here also suggest that elite fragmentation and disagreement within a competitive political process, which Jack Snyder cites as an explanation for overexpansionist policies, are more likely to produce underbalancing than overbalancing behavior among threatened incoherent states.96 This is because a balancing strategy carries certain political costs and risks with few, if any, compensating short-term political gains, and because the strategic environment is always somewhat uncertain. Consequently, logrolling among fragmented elites within threatened states is more likely to generate overly cautious responses to threats than overreactions to them. This dynamic captures the underreaction of democratic states to the rise of Nazi Germany during the interwar period.97 In addition to elite fragmentation, I have suggested some basic domestic-level variables that regularly intervene to thwart balance of power predictions.

### 2ac – heg good

#### Things are getting better now because of hegemony—intensity and number of wars are at the lowest in history

Drezner 5—Professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, Daniel, “Gregg Easterbrook, war, and the dangers of extrapolation”, Blog @ Danieldrezner.com, 5/25, <http://www.danieldrezner.com/archives/002087.html>

Daily explosions in Iraq, massacres in Sudan, the Koreas staring at each other through artillery barrels, a Hobbesian war of all against all in eastern Congo--combat plagues human society as it has, perhaps, since our distant forebears realized that a tree limb could be used as a club. But here is something you would never guess from watching the news: War has entered a cycle of decline. Combat in Iraq and in a few other places is an exception to a significant global trend that has gone nearly unnoticed--namely that, for about 15 years, there have been steadily fewer armed conflicts worldwide. In fact, it is possible that a person's chance of dying because of war has, in the last decade or more, become the lowest in human history. Is Easterbrook right? He has a few more paragraphs on the numbers: The University of Maryland studies find the number of wars and armed conflicts worldwide peaked in 1991 at 51, which may represent the most wars happening simultaneously at any point in history. Since 1991, the number has fallen steadily. There were 26 armed conflicts in 2000 and 25 in 2002, even after the Al Qaeda attack on the United States and the U.S. counterattack against Afghanistan. By 2004, Marshall and Gurr's latest study shows, the number of armed conflicts in the world had declined to 20, even after the invasion of Iraq. All told, there were less than half as many wars in 2004 as there were in 1991. Marshall and Gurr also have a second ranking, gauging the magnitude of fighting. This section of the report is more subjective. Everyone agrees that the worst moment for human conflict was World War II; but how to rank, say, the current separatist fighting in Indonesia versus, say, the Algerian war of independence is more speculative. Nevertheless, the Peace and Conflict studies name 1991 as the peak post-World War II year for totality of global fighting, giving that year a ranking of 179 on a scale that rates the extent and destructiveness of combat. By 2000, in spite of war in the Balkans and genocide in Rwanda, the number had fallen to 97; by 2002 to 81; and, at the end of 2004, it stood at 65. This suggests the extent and intensity of global combat is now less than half what it was 15 years ago. Easterbrook spends the rest of the essay postulating the causes of this -- the decline in great power war, the spread of democracies, the growth of economic interdependence, and even the peacekeeping capabilities of the United Nations. Easterbrook makes a lot of good points -- most people are genuinely shocked when they are told that even in a post-9/11 climate, there has been a steady and persistent decline in wars and deaths from wars. That said, what bothers me in the piece is what Easterbrook leaves out. First, he neglects to mention the biggest reason for why war is on the decline -- there's a global hegemon called the United States right now. Easterbrook acknowledges that "the most powerful factor must be the end of the cold war" but he doesn't understand why it's the most powerful factor. Elsewhere in the piece he talks about the growing comity among the great powers, without discussing the elephant in the room: the reason the "great powers" get along is that the United States is much, much more powerful than anyone else. If you quantify power only by relative military capabilities, the U.S. is a great power, there are maybe ten or so middle powers, and then there are a lot of mosquitoes. [If the U.S. is so powerful, why can't it subdue the Iraqi insurgency?--ed. Power is a relative measure -- the U.S. might be having difficulties, but no other country in the world would have fewer problems.] Joshua Goldstein, who knows a thing or two about this phenomenon, made this clear in a Christian Science Monitor op-ed three years ago: We probably owe this lull to the end of the cold war, and to a unipolar world order with a single superpower to impose its will in places like Kuwait, Serbia, and Afghanistan. The emerging world order is not exactly benign – Sept. 11 comes to mind – and Pax Americana delivers neither justice nor harmony to the corners of the earth. But a unipolar world is inherently more peaceful than the bipolar one where two superpowers fueled rival armies around the world. The long-delayed "peace dividend" has arrived, like a tax refund check long lost in the mail. The difference in language between Goldstein and Easterbrook highlights my second problem with "The End of War?" Goldstein rightly refers to the past fifteen years as a "lull" -- a temporary reduction in war and war-related death. The flip side of U.S. hegemony being responsible for the reduction of armed conflict is what would happen if U.S. hegemony were to ever fade away. Easterbrook focuses on the trends that suggest an ever-decreasing amount of armed conflict -- and I hope he's right. But I'm enough of a realist to know that if the U.S. should find its primacy challenged by, say, a really populous non-democratic country on the other side of the Pacific Ocean, all best about the utility of economic interdependence, U.N. peacekeeping, and the spread of democracy are right out the window. UPDATE: To respond to a few thoughts posted by the commenters: 1) To spell things out a bit more clearly -- U.S. hegemony important to the reduction of conflict in two ways. First, U.S. power can act as a powerful if imperfect constraint on pairs of enduring rivals (Greece-Turkey, India-Pakistan) that contemplate war on a regular basis. It can't stop every conflict, but it can blunt a lot ofthem. Second, and more important to Easterbrook's thesis, U.S. supremacy in conventional military affairs prevents other middle-range states -- China, Russia, India, Great Britain, France, etc. -- from challenging the U.S. or each other in a war. It would be suicide for anyone to fight a war with the U.S., and if any of these countries waged a war with each other, the prospect of U.S. intervention would be equally daunting.

### AT: Endless War

#### No risk of endless warfare

Gray 7—Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies and Professor of International Relations and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, graduate of the Universities of Manchester and Oxford, Founder and Senior Associate to the National Institute for Public Policy, formerly with the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the Hudson Institute (Colin, July, “The Implications of Preemptive and Preventive War Doctrines: A Reconsideration”, <http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/ssi10561/ssi10561.pdf>)

7. A policy that favors preventive warfare expresses a futile quest for absolute security. It could do so. Most controversial policies contain within them the possibility of misuse. In the hands of a paranoid or boundlessly ambitious political leader, prevention could be a policy for endless warfare. However, the American political system, with its checks and balances, was designed explicitly for the purpose of constraining the executive from excessive folly. Both the Vietnam and the contemporary Iraqi experiences reveal clearly that although the conduct of war is an executive prerogative, in practice that authority is disciplined by public attitudes. Clausewitz made this point superbly with his designation of the passion, the sentiments, of the people as a vital component of his trinitarian theory of war. 51 It is true to claim that power can be, and indeed is often, abused, both personally and nationally. It is possible that a state could acquire a taste for the apparent swift decisiveness of preventive warfare and overuse the option. One might argue that the easy success achieved against Taliban Afghanistan in 2001, provided fuel for the urge to seek a similarly rapid success against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. In other words, the delights of military success can be habit forming. On balance, claim seven is not persuasive, though it certainly contains a germ of truth. A country with unmatched wealth and power, unused to physical insecurity at home—notwithstanding 42 years of nuclear danger, and a high level of gun crime—is vulnerable to demands for policies that supposedly can restore security. But we ought not to endorse the argument that the United States should eschew the preventive war option because it could lead to a futile, endless search for absolute security. One might as well argue that the United States should adopt a defense policy and develop capabilities shaped strictly for homeland security approached in a narrowly geographical sense. Since a president might misuse a military instrument that had a global reach, why not deny the White House even the possibility of such misuse? In other words, constrain policy ends by limiting policy’s military means. This argument has circulated for many decades and, it must be admitted, it does have a certain elementary logic. It is the opinion of this enquiry, however, that the claim that a policy which includes the preventive option might lead to a search for total security is **not at all convincing**. Of course, folly in high places is always possible, which is one of the many reasons why popular democracy is the superior form of government. It would be absurd to permit the fear of a futile and dangerous quest for absolute security to preclude prevention as a policy option. Despite its absurdity, this rhetorical charge against prevention is a stock favorite among prevention’s critics. It should be recognized and dismissed for what it is, a debating point with little pragmatic merit. And strategy, though not always policy, **must be nothing if not pragmatic**.

## China

### Non UQ 1

#### The da only works with countries like Cuba- we

#### US influence high now – Obama trip.

Sabatini 13. [Christopher, editor-in-chief of Americas Quarterly and senior director for policy of the Americas Society/Council of the Americas, "Guest post: At last, US recognition of its national interest in Latin America" Financial Times -- blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2013/05/13/guest-post-at-last-us-recognition-of-its-national-interest-in-latin-america/#axzz2TaN36YjO]

It’s become a common refrain: US influence in the western hemisphere is on the wane. Whether measured by the US’s commercial weight in the region or its ability to dictate the terms of debate on everything from Cuba to narcotics, there is little doubt that the “Colossus to the North” is confronting a more diverse and at times contentious hemisphere.¶ President Obama’s trip to Mexico and Costa Rica in May and Vice President Joe Biden’s plans to travel to Brazil, Colombia and Trinidad and Tobago reflect – at long last – the US’s recognition of its national interest in the rising economic and diplomatic powers of its hemisphere and its capacity to influence its current and potential allies.¶ Policy in the first four years of the Obama administration was marked by nice-sounding rhetoric of partnership and failed efforts to reach out to wayward countries – Bolivia and Ecuador. The Obama administration believed it could win back the region simply by not being the Bush administration and by dedicating high-level diplomatic resources to woo Ecuador – having Secretary of State Hillary Clinton give a major policy speech in Quito – and by negotiating the re-entry of the US Agency for International Development in Bolivia. The first effort was rewarded when Ecuador granted asylum at its embassy in London to Julian Assange, founder of WikiLeaks, and when it led a regional assault to undermine the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights this year. The second effort failed on May 1, when Bolivian President Evo Morales said he was kicking USAID out of his country, again.¶ The region has changed, and with it the ability of the US to influence individual countries simply by leveraging its development dollars or its regional prestige.¶ That’s not to say, however, that the US is irrelevant or lacks resources. Despite the rhetoric of populist leaders in Ecuador and Venezuela (and the assumptions of many US commentators), popular opinion in Latin America toward the US remains positive. In central America between 70 and 80 per cent of citizens have favourable opinions of the US; even in Venezuela and Ecuador over 60 per cent of citizens are predisposed to liking the yanquis.¶ In the economic realm, across the hemisphere, the US has declined in absolute and in some cases in relative terms as an exporter to Latin American and as a market for its exports – but not by as much as many media accounts would have you believe. For example, in Brazil in 1995, the US provided 21 per cent of imports and bought 21 per cent of exports; by 2011 that had declined to 15 per cent and 10 per cent, respectively. It was the same in Chile, where imports from the US dropped from 25 per cent in 1995 to 20 per cent by 2011, and the US market for Chilean exports contracted from 14 per cent to 11 per cent in the same period.¶ Yes, Latin America has joined global markets. But the US remains central, especially for countries with the fastest rates of growth and the greatest long-term potential. That’s no coincidence. Unlike China, the US is a market for Latin America’s higher-end manufactured goods. Mexico has been been particularly good in seizing the advantage of the US market provided by NAFTA to move up the value chain and is now exporting automobiles and aeronautic equipment globally.¶ The US is now seeking to play this economic card – the power of its market. The countries that President Obama and Vice President Biden have selected to visit and the message they have delivered underscore both the importance of those countries to the US and a new-found effort to buttress diplomacy with economic promise.¶ Key to this will be negotiation of the Trans-Pacific Partnership. It will unite 11 countries – Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the US and Vietnam – representing a combined GDP of almost $21tn (about 30 per cent of world GDP) and $4.4tn in exports of goods and services. The effort has attracted the attention of Japan and South Korea – which, if they join, would bring the the agreement to a total of 40 per cent of global GDP – and Colombia. It’s also provoking envy in Brazil.¶ So it should. Although Brazil secured the election of Roberto Azevêdo as head of the World Trade Organization, Brazil has only a slim stake in the global free trade economy. One of five members of Mercosur, the southern cone customs union (which last year, curiously, admitted Venezuela), Brazil’s free trade agenda has been tied to that of its sometimes less liberally-inclined neighbours, particularly Argentina. Mercosur, which, as a customs union, requires that member countries negotiate free trade agreements as a bloc, has FTAs with countries or blocs that represent a mere $692bn of GDP. Compare that with the FTAs that Chile has with countries and blocs with a combined GDP of $53tn or Peru, whose FTAs link it to economies with a combined GDP of $50tn.¶ This week, it was announced that both President Sebastian Piñera of Chile and President Ollanta Humala of Peru will visit Washington to meet President Obama in June. Clearly, the US has seen free trade and its domestic market as a card to play with emerging economic powers in the region, while sending a subtle message to the others that they are free to join in if they like, or wallow in the past.

### US Investment Inev.

#### US investment and influence inevitable.

Alvarado 5-13. [Liza Torres, former diplomat in the Mission of Venezuela to the Organization of American States, "The U.S. Must Re-evaluate its Foreign Policy in Latin America" Diplomatic Courier -- www.diplomaticourier.com/news/regions/latin-america/1457-the-us-must-re-evaluate-its-foreign-policy-in-latin-america]

Relations between the United States and Latin America have experienced cyclical ups and downs. Geographically, the United States and Latin America are linked and have a natural shared market, so there will always be a relationship of one sort or another. The United States will continue to seek to exert its influence over the region, whether through future plans for the placement of military bases or the promotion of bilateral trade agreements.

### Not Zero Sum

#### Not zero sum – Latin America will balance not pick – Brazil proves Chinese influence inevitable.

Cerna 11. [Michael, staff @ CRC, "China's growing presence in Latin America: Implications for US and Chinese presence in the region" China Research Center -- Vol 10 No 1 -- www.chinacenter.net/chinas-growing-presence-in-latin-america-implications-for-u-s-and-chinese-presence-in-the-region/]

With both the U.S. and China jockeying for influence in a world where political power relations are changing, Latin America has the most to gain. The primary concern for the region is that it does not become a battle ground for a neo-Cold War between China and the U.S. Brazil already has clearly stated its concerns regarding Chinese influence. Yet, despite this tension, Brazil is now too reliant on China to turn away from the path on which Lula set the country. Agricultural exports to China are crucial to Brazil’s economy. Lula’s Brazil supported China politically and made clear moves away from the United States. Now Rouseff’s administration has welcomed Barack Obama with open arms. With all three major actors going through stages that could influence the global economic and political landscape – China implementing its 12th five-year plan, Brazil cementing itself as a prominent world player and the U.S. still recovering from a terrible financial crisis – this dynamic relationship is one that deserves close attention from all those concerned with the future of China-U.S. relations. Where Brazil and the rest of Latin America were once looking for an alternative to U.S. influence and found China, the region may now be looking to the U.S. to strike a balance with growing Chinese influence. With the global ambitions of Latin America, namely Brazil, it is essential to maintain close ties with both the United States and China. The world will be watching.

### Heg Impact Turn

#### Close LA-China relations boxes out the US – decks heg.

Dominguez 6. [Jorge, Professor @ Harvard’s Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, "China's Relations With Latin America: Shared Gains, Asymmetric Hopes" Inter-American Dialogue Working Paper -- June -- www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/china.pdf]

There is, of course, a delicate triangular ¶ problem. To the extent that China may assist ¶ Latin America to combat “hegemonism,” ¶ problems may develop in U.S.-Chinese relations. And, if Latin American states look at ¶ the world strategically from the perspective ¶ of self-interest, as Chinese academics claim, ¶ then Latin American officials may—in classic neorealist fashion—seek Chinese support ¶ to provide a “soft” balance U.S. influence ¶ in Latin America. Chinese academics are ¶ acutely aware that the United States considers Latin America to be its backyard ¶ (houyuan). Jiang Shixue, a scholar at the ¶ CASS, has put it as follows: The rapid development of China-Latin ¶ America relations has not yet posed ¶ a security threat to the United States, ¶ but China is currently in the process ¶ of becoming a political competitor in ¶ America’s own backyard… some Latin ¶ American countries may use China to ¶ challenge American hegemony.34¶ Jiang Shixue also avers that China and Latin ¶ America share interests in “building a new ¶ economic order and opposing hegemonism.” ¶ Xu Shicheng, also from the CASS, attributes left-wing election victories in Brazil, ¶ Venezuela, and Uruguay to Latin American ¶ anger at neoliberal economic policies and ¶ a desire to take a firmer stance against U.S. ¶ dominance in the region.35

####  1nc – no collapse

#### The CCP is will survive no matter what

Epstein 10 (Gady, Beijing Bureau Chief for Forbes, “The Chinese Communist Party Is Like God,” Forbes, 5-21, <http://www.forbes.com/2010/05/21/china-communist-party-god-book-opinions-contributors-beijing-dispatch_2.html>)

BEIJING -- A common parlor game in the China-watching crowd used to be debating how long the Communist Party could hold on to power. A number of bets on the party's demise were made a decade ago that can't be called until they expire in 2020 or 2030, but today those bets look silly. Few would bet against the party now without getting lottery-like odds. How did that come to be? How has China's ruling party become a seemingly durable authoritarian regime? Why, two decades after a period of uncertainty and upheaval, do the people seem satisfied enough to acquiesce to being ruled by the party? A fascinating and ambitious nonfiction book helps answer the how, and a clever Chinese dystopian novel seeks to answer the why. Together they pull back the curtain on one of the most intriguing characters of our time, the Communist Party of China. In his revealing new book The Party, author Richard McGregor, who covered China for London's Financial Times, lays bare the secretive machinery of the party, how it operates far more pervasively in public life and commerce than many suspect. A powerful symbol of this hidden reach of the party is the secure internal network of "red machines," phones that sit on the desks of some 300 of the nation's most elite officials. Even more interesting is on whose desks you'll find those phones: not only members of the Politburo, but also the chief executives of 50 of the nation's biggest companies. Paranoid conspiracy theorists on China will have plenty to feast on in McGregor's accounts of the failed deals of Chinalco and Unocal. (Though you're not really paranoid if Beijing really is calling the shots for their big resources companies.) "The Party is like God," a professor from People's University in Beijing tells McGregor. "He is everywhere. You just can't see him." (Read an essay adapted from The Partyhere.) The Party is not simply an account of how the party succeeds in ruling through its mechanisms of autocracy. The party's Achilles' heel--its lack of any independent check on its power--undermines at every turn its efforts to police corruption, vet its members, reform its bureaucracy and respond to crises. The maneuvering required to conduct a high-level corruption investigation sounds like it is out of a mafia movie. Taking down a Politburo member, former Shanghai Party Secretary Chen Liangyu, required a side deal to keep hands off of the family of former General Secretary Jiang Zemin, whose consent for the takedown was required because he was the reigning kingpin of the Shanghai faction, despite the fact that he no longer held any official leadership posts. The party's apparatus of control dominated every stage of decision-making in the disastrous Sanlu milk powder scandal, from covering up melamine contamination that poisoned thousands of babies to censoring media coverage that could have saved lives to blocking legal action that could have given families some measure of justice and deterred future corporate misbehavior. At every stage where some check or balance might exist in a democratic system, the one-party system failed its people. But, as McGregor notes, the party does succeed at its main task, protecting itself. In exchange for acquiescence to autocratic rule, the party delivers on the economy and largely stays out of people's private lives. And as Chan Koon Chung writes in his novel The Fat Years, the people indeed acquiesce.

### Tech Impact Turn

#### Chinese influence trades off with Latin American manufacturing

Ellis 6. [Evan, Associate with Booz Allen Hamilton, Inc., with an emphasis on Latin American security issues, PhD in Political Science, "The New Chinese Engagement with Latin America: Understanding its Dynamics and the Implications for the Region" Booz-Allen -- March 3 -- www6.miami.edu/hemispheric-policy/ellisthenewchineseengagementwithlatinamerica030306.pdf]

A more tangible, economic impact of China in Latin America has been the economic ¶ damage caused to the manufacturing sector. According to the International Monetary ¶ Fund, 90% of total PRC exports are manufactured goods where the PRC has an ¶ enormous advantage in labor costs.83 The result of lower PRC labor costs under ¶ increasingly open global trade regimes is that the PRC has been able to underprice ¶ Latin American manufacturers and displace them from their traditional export markets ¶ such as the United States and the countries of the European Union. As shown in the ¶ figure below, for example, with the expiration of the Multi-Fiber agreement maintaining ¶ quotas in textiles, the Chinese share of the US clothing market rose from 25% to 56%, ¶ while the share held by Latin American